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MILITARY RESURGENCE AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

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Abstract
The emergence of liberal democracy in Africa was assumed to be a way out of the problems of governance in the continent. As such, many scholars in the field of political science argued that liberal democracy is more promising, secured, transparent, fair and people friendly. Yet, the recent military intervention in Sudan, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger and Gabon appears to be pointing at liberal democracy as a failing political system in Africa. This paper examined the resurgence of military in Africa and its effects on liberal democracy. This paper adopted descriptive research method, extracted information from secondary sources of data and used classical theory of civil-military relations as theoretical framework. The paper argued that factors such as external factors, ethnic dominance, economic and sit-tight syndrome of Africa elected leaders have triggered recent resurgence of military in Africa. The paper thus recommended among others, that AU should make use of the instrument such as the Lome declaration of 2000 and its charter of democracy and governance of 2007.When dealing with military coups, government structures must be more inclusive and proper space for civil society. African leaders need to foster rapid economic transformation. Lastly, African leaders should be wary of new friends such as China, Russia, and Turkey in terms of support structures.

Keywords: military resurgence, democracy, Africa, coup d'etat

Introduction

Democracy as a system or form of rule is assuming a 'universal value' in itself and is widely considered a 'de fault' government due largely to its intrinsic, instrumental and constructive values (Rostboll, 2013). While democratic form of government is increasingly being considered with global acceptance as a value, it has been popularized as a preferred form of rule due to what it means for citizens and what benefits it creates. Democracy is first valued for guaranteeing participation in the political life of a community or country by a broad spectrum of citizens. These represent the functional activation of citizens' freedoms undergirded by the constitution. This freedom resonates with citizens' autonomy for self rule as individuals and in the collectivity as a community. Participation in public life represents the undiluted function of democracy in the Athenian city state being the etymological roots of 'people rule'. It is in this sense that democracy has been accepted and transformed from Greece by the revolutionary eruptions in France, the enlightenment age in England and the American Revolution. Fukuyama, (2010)

The instrumental value of democracy that entrenched responsive and coercive accountability through the mechanism of election also took roots in Athens but has also been transformed and refined since the 19th Century. The signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 followed by the French and American Revolutions entrenched the power of the electorates to sanction representatives who fail to perform to their satisfaction. Democratic accountability in the 21st Century is seen as the most enduring function of democracy and a value in itself. The power of citizens to shape public policy and influence operations of government in response to their needs is activated by democratic accountability (Schmitter& Karl, 1991).

Constructively, democracy guarantees engagement by citizens through exchanges and debates that shape societal values. Democracy provides the incentives for the formulation of values and in the understanding of needs, rights and duties. The intrinsic importance of political participation and freedom; the instrumental relevance of ensuring a responsive and accountable government and the constructive role of democracy in formulation of values are essential to democratic consolidation in the era of globalization in Africa (Schmitter, 2007).

Though in fits and bursts, Africa joined the Huntingtonian 'third wave of democracy' that began in Portugal in 1974 and later also spread to Latin America and even Asia. The relapse of democracy in Africa in the 1980s was ignited in the 1990s that coincided with the influential forces of globalization and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The surge for democracy has remained strong ever since. However, consolidation of democracy in Africa for the sustenance of democratic values has been challenged by the emerging phenomenon of 'constitutional coups' to further entrench or protect personal rule and undermine the functioning of genuine democracy. Elected presidents have devised means of reinventing personal rule in Africa earlier rejected through democratization by seeking to amend their constitutions to extend executive term limits. This is the central argument here. It is widely referred to as 'third term' in the continent. More than 24 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have tried this with 18 successful cases against three failed attempts. Genyi, (2015)

Against this backdrop, this paper explores the phenomenon of 'constitutional coups' in Africa with a view to highlighting its impact on the continent's fledgling democracies. To this end, the rest of the paper is structured to as follows: the next section relates globalization as a concept and process in the development dynamics of the continent to the spread of democracy in Africa; then the emergence of the phenomenon of 'constitutional coups' is used to show how in the face of globalization, it is undermining democratic values; while the conclusion argues for building strong and resilient democratic institutions that would act as a bulwark against the resurgence of authoritarian tendencies in African democracies.

Conceptual Clarification

Military Resurgence

Resurgence of military coup is an expression of the audacious re-emergence of military incursions and the preposterous dismantling of democratically elected civilian government. Globally, military regimes have been described as an aberration and a deviation from the norms. However, in Africa and many other developing or third world societies, some democratic leaders have performed awfully. In fact, some seemingly consolidated democracies in Africa are still either fragile or struggling to retain its identity as a nation. This predisposed such states to danger. Leadership deficits and poor governance increased the vulnerability of these states to military coups and popular protests against democratic governance. In Africa and West Africa specifically, it is pertinent to note that the recurring or the resurgence of military coups do not imply that democracy has failed, it simply means that democratically elected leaders have failed. Therefore, the coups (whether invited by the

people or willful intervention by the military) are unfortunate but an expression of disappointment by some members of the political community. Odigbo,et al (2023). The resurgence of military activity in Africa has been driven by a range of factors, including political instability, economic insecurity, and the rise of extremist groups (Bryant, 2021). The influence of foreign actors, such as China, Russia, and Turkey, has also contributed to this trend, as they seek to expand their influence on the continent and challenge the traditional dominance of Western powers (Taylor, 2022).

The term 'military resurgence' has been used by scholars to refer to the renewed emphasis on military power in Africa, particularly in the context of the resurgence of conflict and instability on the continent (Nyovani, 2021). Some scholars argue that the resurgence of military power is being driven by a combination of internal and external factors, including domestic power struggles, competition for resources, and the legacy of colonialism and imperialism (Mohammed & Adamu, 2022).

The resurgence of military power in Africa has been defined by scholars in various ways. For example, some scholars have defined it as a 'new wave of militarism' (Mohammed & Adamu, 2022), while others have referred to it as a 'militarization of political order' (Hedges, 2021). Still others have characterized it as a 'reflexive reaction' to perceived security threats (Ganesh, 2022).

Some scholars have identified the rise of 'hybrid warfare' as a key feature of the military resurgence in Africa, as states and non-state actors increasingly employ a mix of conventional and unconventional tactics, including cyberattacks, propaganda, and economic warfare (Hedges, 2021).

The role of social media and other digital technologies in fueling military resurgence has also been highlighted by scholars, as these platforms are increasingly used by extremist groups and governments to spread propaganda, recruit fighters, and monitor their opponents (Ganesh, 2022).For the sake of this paper, military resurgence is defined as a renewed focus by military in African nations as a means of achieving political ,economic, and security objectives in the face of ongoing conflict ,instability ,and external interference

Democracy

Appadorai (2004) described democracy as a system of government under which the people exercise the governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by them. He further explained that a state may, in political science, be termed a democracy if it provides institutions for the expression and, in the last analysis, the supremacy of the popular will on basic questions of social direction and policy (Nwanegbo&Odigbo 2012). Therefore, democracy embodies virtuous principles necessary for inclusive, progressive and stable society. In all, democracy has inbuilt principles and institutional mechanisms for development thereby establishing linkages between democratic practices and development in every society. With these innate or inherent abilities, it strives to provide greatest happiness to greater number of people in the society. Odigbo, et al (2023).

A definition of democracy by Lijphart emphasizes the importance of both democratic participation and civil liberties, noting that democracy entails not just the right to vote but also the right to participate in political decision-making (Lijphart, 2022). Rhodes's definition emphasizes the accountability of rulers to the people and the people's right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections (Rhodes, 2021). This suggests that democracy is not just about the process of electing leaders but also about ensuring that those leaders are responsive to the will of the people.

Democracy is a political system in which power rests with the citizens, who have the right to choose their leaders and hold them accountable through free and fair elections, and in which all citizens enjoy equal rights and opportunities. (Dahl, 2021). Democracy is a form of government that provides for popular control of public policy by ensuring equality of political opportunity, freedom of speech, and the rule of law. (Carnoy, 2022). For the purpose of this paper, Democracy is a system of government in which citizens exercise their power through free and fair elections, and in which all people enjoy equal rights and opportunities.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on classical theory of civil - military relations theories by Samuel p. in 1957. Other proponents of Huntington thesis are Eliot Cohen, a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins university, United State of America. Conscious efforts to develop civil-military relations as a field of academic research were launched after the Second World War in the 1950s and 1960s. For the first couple of decades, it was a predominantly American-centred academic discipline that dealt mostly with the dynamics between the military, social elites and ordinary citizens with a special emphasis on the role of military leaders and top politicians in shaping US foreign and defence policy. From the very beginning, civil-military relations have been an interdisciplinary area of research that combines inputs from political analysts, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and economists. During the last half-century, Samuel Huntington's thoughts have largely dominated civil military discussions in the West. Up to present day, Huntington's book, The Soldier and the State (1957), has remained one of the key works on democratic control. It is used as a manual for educating officers in American military academies. Huntington's ideas have shaped civil-military theories in the US and, as the US is a global power, in many other Western countries as well.

Huntington claims that there is a specific mindset – a military mind – that is characterised by conservative realism, i.e. a belief that a strong defence capability and an efficient military function are most important for all states. Real civil control is achieved by reinforcing the beliefs held by the military and not by subjecting them to civilian thinking. Huntington asserts that the aim of ideal or 'objective' civil control is to reach the highest possible level of military professionalism. This can be done by drawing a clear line between military and civilian activities. Civilians should make political plans and military leaders should make military plans. Politicians should define strategic objectives for national defence without interfering in tactics. Military leaders should be independent from politicians in pursuing military activities.

This very clear separation of civilian and military functions is considered to be the weak point in Huntington's theory (Burk, 2002). Huntington's approach was suitable for the year 1957 and a bipolar world. In comparison with the clarity and symmetry of the Cold War era, however, contemporary international conflicts are much more complicated and asymmetric. The line between military and civilian functions has become blurred. In addition to national military units, every theatre of operations usually contains international (e.g. NATO, EU or UN) units, mercenaries, security guards, nongovernmental organisations, journalists, private businesses and observers. This is why it has become hard to separate military and civilian tasks as cleanly as Huntington did

Morris Janowitz's book, Professional Soldier (1960), offers the best alternative to Huntington's theory. Like Huntington, Janowitz has an abundance of academic followers and admirers among researchers interested in civil-military relations. The debate between (the schools of) Huntington and Janowitz focuses on whether more efficient civil control over the military is achieved by strict separation or full integration of civilian and military decision-

making processes. According to Huntington, the military are unique, they do not belong to the civilian world and this is how it should stay. Janowitz claims, however, that the military and society form an organic whole that should not be torn apart (Schiff, 1995). According to Janowitz, it is very dangerous to treat the military as an institution that does not form a part of society or to alienate the military from society (Janowitz, 1960:270). The military should follow the same rhythm of development as the rest of society and should keep up with political changes. Civil control is achieved by encouraging competition for resources and attention.

Janowitz denies the possibility of drawing a clear line between civilian and military functions. His empirical study of the US military in the 20th century contains an analysis of the social background, origin, motives, lifestyle, status and other similar characteristics of military personnel. Janowitz claims that the Allied victory in the Second World War and innovations in military technology have brought about changes in the nature of military operations and society as a whole that have shifted the emphasis on the gendarmerie role of the military. Janowitz uses the term 'constabulary forces' to describe these new forces.

Berman and Laitin also criticized theory of civil-military relations according to Huntington , they were of the opinion that Military institutions in Africa have often been used as instruments of political power rather than as neutral defenders of the state (Berman & Laitin, 2018).in the same vein , the militarization of African politics has been fueled by external interventions, such as the Cold War, which led to the proliferation of arms and military training (Berman & Laitin, 2018).

History of Military Resurgence in Africa.

The 1960s were once called the "the military decade in Africa," given that the continent was plagued by coups during this period (Zoiberg 1973). In West Africa, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Mali all experienced one or more successful coups between 1960 and 1970 alone. (McGowan 2006) In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of African leaders were assassinated or forced from office by coups d'état. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, only five countries in Africa held competitive elections on a regular basis. (Greenblatt 2012). The dynamics was changed following the third wave democratic wind that swept most of these regimes away and ushering in regimes that could lay claim to power through multiparty electoral processes. These changes witnessed at the national political levels also played out in international relations. Apart from development partners insisting that African countries must democratize to have access to funds, regional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS and the African Union AU has enshrined it in their protocol and charter that only democratically elected officials would be allowed to have dealings with the institutions respectively.

The shared combination of these factors is enough to push almost all the countries in the continent towards the path of democracy and openness. However, the nature of these societies particularly countries of the west African sub-region and the structure of the political economy makes the foundation of these democracies shaky with constant threat of collapsing or not holding up. Some of these countries have been able to endure great elastic push which others such as Mali, Niger, Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome/ Principe were not able to withstand. In these counties the intervention of the military can no longer be said to be corrective as the military institution has been fingered as the problem for most of them but the trail of these scenario is uncertainty and instability that is detrimental to the economic wellbeing of these countries. The question we should attempt to answer here is why does the military institution abandon its traditional role for the society and dive into direct

participation and control of state apparatus? So many factors have been advanced as responsible for this development.

The first point here is the complex relationship that exists between the civil authority and the military, the problem of civil-military relations. Some scholars such as Wintrobe (1988), Wintrobe (1990) and Mcguire, Olson, (1996) and Besley and Robinson (2009) has analyzed the opposition between civil government (democratic or non-democratic) and military dictatorship. Acemoglu*et al.* (2010) on his part attempted to categorize dictatorial regime types into three viz; non-democratic civil government, military dictatorship and democratic civil government. The study identifies the army as agent of the powerful elite which uses it as an instrument to guarantee its survival through repression of decent. The uneven income distribution in these societies and the relevance of the army becomes stronger, especially in a contest where the political competition takes shape between polarized groups, fighting to obtain power and rents. The origin of these groups develops along different cleavages, such as ethnic or regional origins, religion, ownership of the production factors and so on. The clash between these polarized and fragmented groups determines winners and losers, involved in violent fighting to gain the control of the State (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Montalvo and ReynalQuerol, 2007; Alesina et al., 2003 and Fearon, 2004). It is this kind of social situation with different groups fighting for power that raises the opportunity for civil war and coup d'état.

In terms of military resurgence, British and French colonial policies in Africa differed in a number of ways. For example, France pursued a policy of direct rule, in which military forces were used to impose French authority and control over local populations (Duggan & Williams, 2021). By contrast, the British used a system of indirect rule, in which local rulers were encouraged to cooperate with British authorities in exchange for autonomy and support (Chaudhuri, 2022). The French military was often used to suppress local rebellions and resistance movements, such as the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (Davis, 2022). The British military was also involved in a number of conflicts in Africa, including the Boer War in South Africa and the first and second Anglo-Sudanese wars (Rogan, 2021). However, the British military tended to be more selective in its use of force, preferring to use diplomacy and economic incentives to maintain its influence in the region (Carroll, 2022). The French colonial empire in Africa was characterized by a strong centralization of power in Paris, which led to the establishment of a highly centralized military structure in the colonies (Jolly & Arnaud, 2021). By contrast, the British colonial empire in Africa tended to be more decentralized, with local rulers and leaders having a significant degree of autonomy and power (Anderson, 2022). The French colonial army was also known for its brutal tactics, including the widespread use of torture and summary executions, in contrast to the British military's emphasis on discipline and professionalism (MacMaster, 2021).

External and internal causes of Military Resurgence in Africa

External factors can also affect the probability of a coup d'état, if a country has some neighbours experiencing ethnic wars and violence, and inside its borders it reproduces the same cleavages, it could be influenced by this circumstance, reproducing these problems. That is, a contagion effect may exist. However, Besley and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al (2010) emphasize that if a country perceives a serious threat of a war between two states, this would reduce the risk of a coup d'état because the army is now necessary for the survival of both the government and the state. Therefore, the politicians (democratic or non-democratic) have to pay the right wage to soldiers, solving the commitment problem that we have analyzed before. A credible threat on the borders can reduce the coup's risk. De Groot (2011) emphasizes the role of external influences in determining political freedom in Africa. He finds that the probability of an improvement in political freedoms increases with a history

of political freedom, openness, and improvements in ethno linguistically similar neighbouring countries.

The role of external forces in fueling military resurgence in Africa is significant. For example, China, Russia, and Turkey have increased their engagement in Africa through military assistance, arms sales, and training programs (Onuoha, 2022). The United States has also continued to play a significant role in Africa's security landscape, including through the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its provision of military assistance to African countries (Blanchard, 2021). The European Union (EU) has also been engaged in African security issues, particularly through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which includes military missions in Mali, Central African Republic, and Somalia (Fiabema, 2022). The African Union (AU) has also taken steps to address the resurgence of military activity on the continent, including the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF) (Idowu, 2021).

External powers have often been accused of exploiting Africa's resources, including its people and natural resources, in their pursuit of military power and influence on the continent. For instance, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is aimed at promoting economic development in Africa, has also been criticized for its focus on infrastructure projects that benefit Chinese interests and can be used to further China's military presence in the region (Zhang, 2021). The Russian government has provided military assistance, arms sales, and training programs to African countries, often to support authoritarian leaders who are willing to cooperate with Moscow (McHugh, 2022). Turkey has been increasingly active in Africa, including through the deployment of troops to countries such as Somalia and Libya, as part of its efforts to increase its global influence (Kyprianou, 2021

Coups d'état in Africa have received some attention in the literature by sociologists and political scientists. For instance, Jackman (1978) estimates a model of the structural determinants of coups d'état for the newly emerged states of Sub-Saharan Africa in the years from 1960 through 1975. The results from that study indicate that social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are destabilizing; a multiparty system is destabilizing (especially when a dominant ethnic group exists) while electoral turnout in the last election before independence is stabilizing. Johnson et al. (1984) replicate the previous work concentrating on military coups, finding serious weaknesses in the original Jackman model. The dataset in this study includes 35 Sub-Saharan African states from 1960 through 1982. They find that states with relatively dynamic economies and whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics. Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), using data on military coups in 33 Sub-Saharan African states between 1957 and 1984, discovered strong support for modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonisms, military centrality theory and aspects of dependency theory. Political development theory is not supported.

Ethnic diversity and competition, military centrality, debt dependence, and political factionalism are r predictors of coup de tat. It was also discovered that ethnic dominance is a stabilizing force that create social integration and weakening opposition. Intractable conflicts rooted in ethnic competition and economic dependence appears to create a structural context for military coups and related instabilities. O'Kane (1993) argues that the underlying causes of coups are specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by poverty. A testable hypothesis is deduced from this theory which is examined through the

application of discriminant analysis to data for three sets of African countries. The models support the theory. Moreover, the chance of a successful coup is negatively related with the absence of a previous coup and the continuing or historic presence of foreign troops since independence.

Collier and Hoeffler (2005) in a panel of African countries from 1960 to 2001 highlight strong similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars, finding that low income and lack of growth are among the main determinants. Both are also subject to 'traps' – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much more likely. Finally, policies that favour the military (high military expenditure) may increase the risk of a coup. These have been the bane of Africa prior to the third wave democratic wind that blew across the continent. But even when some has begun to place regime change via coup de tat as a relic, resurgence is rearing up again in part of the continent. Ogude (2012) posits that this resurgence of military rule in parts of Africa especially West African sub-region can be attributed to many factors, which are not very different from those factors that pushed the military into politics in the years of post-independence. Specifically, he identified the non entrenchment of democracy in some African countries, the quest by incumbents to subvert the democratic processes in other to hang on to power, the lack of socio-economic development in these countries which stokes instability, creating the condition for coup de tat. In that same study Ogude (2012) also identified destructive civil-military relation resulting in fight for power as explanatory variables for the resurgence of the military rule in West African sub-region.

Transitions to democracy became a fad for many countries of sub-Saharan Africa as from1990s (Fosu, 2008). Some happened through blood and violence while others were negotiated. Iys were expected to felt in many areas and especially on the well being and development of the respective countries. Acemoglu, (2009) and Rodrik (2005) have reported positive impacts with expectation of strong institutions that eliminates some evils still in place; have not been entirely beneficial. The main impact of democratisation has been on the seeming progress towards a market based economy. General conclusions have been negative on the immediate impact of democratisation as Sarky, (2012) indicates the total impact of democracy has been the bane of income in sub-Saharan Africa. dominant West African countries have lost some ground in the FDI flows in the recent past due to changes in the domestic environments in the oil industry and nascent entry of Ghana which is not sufficient to replace the reduction being suffered by Nigeria in the face of current internal securities challenges posed by the a supposedly religious sect. Worse still, the two countries have also lost the civilian governance to military which is expected to impact negatively against their financial interrelation with external world. Sorensen, (2010)

Recent Military Resurgence in African Democracy

The first sign came in the early hours of 22 March 2012, with news of a military coup d'état in Mali. The coup leaders claimed a lack of adequate means and resources to fight Tuareg insurgents in the north of the country as the main reason for their action. That announcement by on state television by the coup leaders effectively puts an end to the administration of AmadouToumaniToure as president of Mali. Barely three weeks later, on 12 April 2012, the government of Guinea Bissau was toppled by elements of the country's military after alleged plans by the former to downsize the military. Interestingly, both coups occurred only a couple of weeks prior to scheduled presidential elections. In Mali, outgoing President Toure had made clear his intention to hand over power to a democratically elected president after the 29 April 2012 elections. In Guinea-Bissau, a second round of presidential elections was also scheduled for 29 April 2012, although the leading opposition candidate had opted to boycott the polls, claiming fraud in the first round. Although accession to power through elections has

become the norm in Africa, the two recent coups d'état in West Africa have underscored lingering deficiencies in Africa's contested electoral democracies and their influence on the reoccurrence of coups, particularly in the West African subregion (Ogude, 2012).

Niger

The kind of civilian rule perpetuated by President MamadouTandja of Niger and its potential catastrophic consequences has a lot to do with the success the coupists in Niger recorded. This explains why the recent development in Niger did not arouse bitter resentment against the Junta by the Nigerien populace. The regional grouping, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) realizing this, did not out rightly condemn the coup, but urged the coup leaders to act quickly to restore civilian rule. The cynicism towards civilian governments and elections are being discredited by the actors within the democratic process which creates the opening for changes by other means. The contempt towards corrupt civilian governments is widely shared and Africans seem to have concluded that these governments that have upped expectations, fail to deliver and when the electorate appears helpless to hold them accountable, option from the military seem a welcome trend as indications show from the recent military resurgence in the sub-region. Tandja used democracy to wage war against the media, the civil society and political parties. He hastily drafted a constitution that did not benefit from input from either civil society or the general public. He simply extended his term by 3 years, apparently without election, and allowed for an unlimited number of presidential terms. And yet there cannot be a democracy without a civil society; none without a media, and is almost unthinkable without vibrant opposition political parties, as there is no democracy without the state. Civilian governments without democratic soul or substance are sources of despair and instability, and no good can come out of them. At the same time there is less will and no international mechanism to enforce democratic elections. While banning taking force by force, we failed to come up with alternative sources of effecting political change.

Mali

Mali has clearly been portrayed as the poster-child of good democratic transition in West Africa following the democratic third wave that blew across the world. But this good report was shattered on Wednesday March 23th, 2012 when its president, AmadouToumaniTouré, was toppled by a military junta, thereby setting the clock backwards for the country that seemingly had made a progress on the path of democracy. What is ironic about the Malian coup was that it happened less than one month before the next presidential election. The big question that bugs the mind is to examine the reason behind a resurgence of the military in a country seen to have made a progress on democracy for over a decade witnessing transition from one administration to another in a democratic order (Ndonga, 2008). The answer cannot be farfetched from the fall-out of the conflict in Mali involving the Tuareg minority in the North, the latest round of which has been simmering since the coup occurred, had been proving unexpectedly difficult for government forces to quash. It is obvious inability of the government in Bamako to act decisively over the Tuaregrebellion, that triggered a cabal of soldiers, and led by junior officers, to express their disaffection by seizing the Presidential palace and State TV station (Nossiter, 2012).

Seizure of the Palace therefore is sure part of a string of protests over the way the Malian government has failed to handle the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg National. Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has been fighting for a separate state (its population is spread across the borders into neighbouring Algeria and Niger), and the army have felt increasingly on the back-foot, accusing the Toure government of failing to provide them with sufficient arms and support to defeat the insurgency. The mutiny-turned-coup ignited as the Defence Minister, General SadioGassama, visited a military base in the town of

Kati, approximately 13 miles from the capital, on the said Wednesday morning that the coup took place. As the General departed, protestors began stoning his car and by the afternoon had seized control of the television station in the Bamako, before taking the Palace in the evening. The Army's disquiet is also reflected by military familiesanthe wider populace, particularly in the south of the country, who are unhappy at reports of heavy losses the army is suffering. February saw thousands of citizens take to the streets in protest over the way in which the government had been handling the uprising. Yet, that a coup should have occurred so close to the April 29th elections, when Touré was due to step down, is highly significant. Kirk, H. (2021).

It has been suggested that the seizure of power in this way is indicative of a sentiment among sections of the military, and their supporters in civilian society, who believe that politicians are unable to competently resolve the rebellion in the North. The coup had indeed, interrupted of Mali's democracy and jeopardised its status as bedrock of democracy in West Africa. Not having the right weapons to kill their fellow countrymen may be one, catalytic, cause for the coup; just as likely, however, is the proximate explanation which has seen Touré divide and exploit internal relationships within Tuareg society, protracting violence to the point where the Army feel incapable of winning. Even though programmes for peace and reconciliation, promised by the president following previous rebellions, have failed to get off of the ground – although many Tuareg were previously integrated into the Malian Army, some do not see the Tuareg as Malian citizens. Inspired in part by the diversion caused by the military coup, Tuareg rebels in the north launched incursions deeper into Mali, seizing towns and bases formerly held by government forces fighting the conflict that caused the coup Lewis, (2012).

As military forces have been engaged in consolidating their hold on the capital, the rebels have been able to push southward with little opposition. The distraction of the government troops provided avenue for the MNLA to make advances and consolidate their hold in the north of Mali. Their new found strength also attributed to the Arab Spring especially the fall of Ghadafi whose renegades ran to Mali and West Africa with lots of arms that has now got into the hands of the rebels. The capture of strategic towns in northern Mali by the MNLA including the ancient city of Tinbuktu, Gao and douzenta prompted the separatists group announce an end to the rebellion and declaring an Islamic republic of Azwad (Dioura and Diarra 2012) . Though the events in northern Mali complicated issue, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International community stance on the coup in Mali was enough to force the coupists to recede even though president Traore was not restored back to government. A compromise was brokered in which an Interim government headed by CheickModiboDiarra to organise an election to restore democracy but the issue of MNLA and northern Mali is posing a serious challenge to that that has seen the intervention of United Nations and African Union planning to launch an attack on Mali to dislodge the rebels from their position.

Guinea Bissau

The situation in Guinea Bissau prior to April 12th, 2012 when some elements in the military succeeded in toppling the democratic government of Carlos Gomes Junior, we had witnessed instability sparked by attempts to topple the government on previous occasion. The military unrest of 2010 and a failed coup attempt in 2011 as a result of infighting between the Navy and the Army and the free flow of drugs from Europe and Latin America which has made the country a narcostate. The death of MalamBacaiSanha on January 9th, 2012 led to preparation for a new election which was scheduled to be held within 90 days in accordance with the Guinea Bissau constitution. Despite a peaceful campaign, there were fears of possible

violence or a coup d'état if the army which is obviously not ethnically balanced did not approve of the winner (Zounmenou, 2009).

But the crux of the matter was the decision of Angola to withdraw its forces from the two-year old MISSANG mission to modernise the Guinea Bissau military. The Guinea Bissau military struck following the visit of Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister Jorge Tolentino Araujo to Angola for a meeting with his counterpart CândidoPereira dos Santos Van-Dunemand the Army Chief-of-Staff Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda on the 16th of April 2012. He was also expected to visit the Higher Warfare School (ESG) and the Higher Technical Military Institute (ISTM). All these coupled with unpopularity of Carlos Gomes Juniorwith the army for his attempts to reform the institution where significant explanation for the coup. For instance, there was a report by SIC Noticias of Portugal a day before the coup where an unidentified military commander claimed that Carlos Gomes Júnior would allow Angolan troops into the country citing a “secret document" in the possession of the soldiers to justify his claim that Guinea-Bissau government is about to sanction an Angolan attack on Guinea-Bissau's military. After they struck, the leaders of the coup released an unsigned communiqué that read they "did not have ambitions of power," the coup was a reaction to the alleged agreement with Angola that involved 200 military trainers because it would "annihilate Guinea-Bissau's armed forces.

The Guinea-Bissau coup d’etat was staged by elements of the armed forces about two weeks before the second round of a presidential election between Carlos Gomes Junior and Mohamed lalaEmbalo. Both candidates and the president were initially arrested by the junta. Members of the Military Council, which ran the country until an interim National Transitional Council was established on April 15th 2012, said that one of the reasons for the coup was the incumbent civilian administration's call for support from Angola to reform the military. Following international condemnation and sanctions against leaders of the junta, an agreement was signed that led to the third placed candidate in the election, Manuel SerifoNhamadjo, becoming the interim president. *Adetiloye, et al (2013).* Following the 2012 coup, a military junta led by Captain Amadou Sanogo seized power and established a transitional government (Toulmin, 2021).

History of Military Intervention in Mali

In December 2012, the transitional government signed a peace agreement with the Tuareg rebels, but the security situation in the country remained unstable, with ongoing clashes between government forces and rebel groups (Boukary, 2022). In 2013, the French military intervened in Mali to support the government in its fight against Islamist rebels, as part of Operation Serval (Williams, 2020). In August 2020, a group of military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a coup against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who had been in power since 2013 (Diallo, 2020). After achieving independence in 1960, Mali experienced several military coups and a series of civil conflicts, including the Tuareg rebellions of 1990 and 2012 (Davis, 2021). The 2012 rebellion led to a coup d'état in March 2012, which resulted in the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré, who had been in power since 2002 (Raleigh et al., 2020). The August 2020 coup led to the establishment of a military junta, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), which promised to hold democratic elections within 18 months (Kirk, 2021). However, in May 2021, Colonel Goïta staged a second coup, deposing the transitional president, Bah Ndaw, and appointing himself as interim president (Le Sage, 2021). The military junta led by Colonel Goïta has been criticized by the international community for its human rights violations and abuses, including extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In January 2022, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed

economic sanctions on Mali, including a trade embargo and the suspension of financial aid, in response to the military's failure to hold elections as promised (Africanews, 2022).

Conclusion

This study has interrogated military insurgency in African liberal democratic process with the aim of unraveling the causes that prompted recent surge in military incursion in some democratic states in Africa. The paper concluded that disillusionment arising from insecurity, poor governance and misplaced priorities of government triggered the recent upsurge in military coups and violent crimes in Africa. The paper discovered that the African democratic leaders are losing their popularity and disconnected from their people because they have failed to provide dividence of democracy. Also, influence of western world especially France and Russia has promoted military insurgence in African. This is counter-productive to democratic practice and indeed widened gap and amplify the question of trust that has been very elusive in Africa. It therefore concludes that ending the resurgence of military coups in Africa demands urgent steps to enthrone good governance in Africa's democratic states.

Recommendations

The AU as a body should make use of the instruments it has put in place, such as the Lome Declaration of 2000, and its Charter of Democracy and Governance of 2007, consistently when dealing with military coups. Military insurgence should be seen as an aberration and antithetical to the region's aspiration for stability and development. All forms of insurgence or removal of democratically elected government must attract the same penalties from regional and continental bodies, such as ECOWAS and the AU. African countries need to add term limits to their constitution and criminalise any attempts at tenure elongation. African supranational institutions should support their member states by adding an institutional code of invalidating third terms for incumbent presidents.

Structures of government must be more inclusive and provide a space for civil society engagements, including acceptance of inputs from other sectors such as the military. The depoliticization of the military and effective security reform must be a top priority of African civilian administrations. This is an essential corollary for keeping the military out of power. The peer view process on states needs to be more critical of the levels of governance within African states. The AU has a decisive role to play. African governments need to foster rapid economic transformation that works for the people, by the people, and is owned by the people. While the western governments have failed Africa in terms of providing the required support structures, African states should be wary of new friends such as China, Russia, and Turkey. International relations are driven by the sole interests of states; thus, economic considerations are the main drivers of the scramble for the souls of African states, from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel

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