Journal of Political Discourse

Academic Journal domiciled in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Gusau- Nigeria.

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RADICALIZATION MITIGATION AS COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN NIGERIA: EXAMINING THE PROS AND CONS

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Abstract
The study interrogated the pros and cons of counter-terrorism in Nigeria. This analysis of the literature has shown that the military's leadership was changed, it was cleaned up, and the branch was freed of its pervasive corruption as the first action of each succeeding government. Within a few months, the army had liberated hundreds of Boko Haram prisoners and driven the terrorist organization out of the majority of its strongholds. Refugees who had to flee the violence are returning home. The group nonetheless keeps sending suicide bombers into towns and cities. One of the infamous Chibok girls has been found, but the other four are still missing. Thus, since 2009, terrorist attacks on Nigerians have trended in Figure 1.1. 3,421 terrorist attacks were reported across the nation. According to the graph, the number was highest in 2014 and the lowest in 2009. The study concludes that neither the prevention of radicalization nor its occurrence has had a materially negative impact on Nigeria's efforts to combat terrorism. It was noted that there are currently implemented measures, including legal restrictions, multilateral initiatives, and international cooperation. The study found that these counterterrorism definitions' requirements are not being met by these measures, and they are also failing to achieve their intended objectives. As a result, it suggested fresh approaches to handle the problems mentioned earlier. The goal of this study was to evaluate terrorism and counterterrorism in order to suggest strategies for doing so while also bolstering national security. According to the study, there have been political, economic, and social changes in Nigeria over the years that have in some way or another led to acts that have been classified as terrorism. As a result, some of Nigeria's most important strategies are briefly discussed below considering their pros and cons.

Keywords: Radicalization, Mitigation, Counterterrorism, Strategy, Pros and Cons

Introduction
Since democracy was restored in Nigeria, there has been a rise in conflict and violent crime. Armed robbery, abduction, drug and weapon smuggling, human trafficking, and fighting are all examples of violence and criminality. The fact that domestic terrorists are now posing these dangers instead of foreign-focused organisations like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Jama'ah-e-Islami is of special concern. Acts of violence by armed non-state actors, primarily made up of gangs of teenagers radicalised as foot soldiers, have seriously weakened Nigeria's internal security. In order to further the process, seek recruitment, and radicalise young Nigerians, these violent organisations take advantage of their weaknesses. Many people think that the majority of the group's supporters are jobless adolescents living in unfriendly circumstances and experiencing economic, social, and political challenges. Recent terrorist profiles,

however, reveal that they are not the traditional underprivileged and illiterate teenagers that the public has been led to assume. Instead, they are the result of years of political targets and setbacks that breed resentment and contempt for individuals who are seen as being responsible for these circumstances. One of the biggest dangers to international terrorism in the globe today is the radicalization of youth; Youth who are socially excluded and disenchanted resort to extremism for identity, acceptance, and meaning (Bizina, 2014; Ochoga, 2019; Ochoga, 2021).

Although youth exposure to extremism and violence may be related to their social and economic situations, comprehending rebellion necessitates knowledge of how youth participate in such actions. Designing and creating countermeasures against terrorism requires an understanding of how individuals are persuaded to join armed or terrorist organisations, as these organisations cannot exist without their members. Solving the issue requires an understanding of the processes by which people get radicalised and join terrorist groups. So it's crucial to understand what leads someone to accept terrorism. Studies on job trends are a better addition to these profiles. Numerous sources have been identified as the root of radicalization in Nigeria; as a result, a literary pyramid has been established. In contrast to how counterterrorism is mitigated, Bizin (2014); Ochoga (2019), Ochoga (2021) et al. have mostly concentrated on the causes of terrorism. Based on this knowledge gap, this study seeks to examine the relevant topics and learn more about counterterrorism and radicalization in Nigeria.

Research Problem

The research problematique of the study is that, political marginalisation, or perceived political marginalisation, of ethnic or religious groups increases the likelihood of young people becoming radicalised and becoming violent extremists. Due to the fact that the marginalisation of ethnic minorities in Nigeria, notably in the Niger Delta, is commonly cited as a contributing reason to the youth violence in the area, this is the case. Occasionally, violent extremist groups, like the Ibos in Nigeria, would use political exclusion as justification. However, it's also possible for terrorist organisations to establish themselves and thrive in highly democratic countries (eg leftwing terrorism in Germany in the 1970s, the Provisional IRA in Britain, ETA in Spain).

Some studies vary between internal and international terrorism as well as source and target nations (Windsor, 2003, and Schmid, 2006). Violent extremism has long been seen to be fueled by poor government. The underlying rationale is that democratic institutions and procedures assist in addressing the underlying issues that have contributed to the recent rise of youth, promoting the amicable resolution of differences and offering avenues for involvement in policymaking (Windsor, 2003). Schmid (2006) argues that State weakness encourages revolt, whereas misuse of authority and the accumulation of excessive power strengthens opposition and provides openings for terrorist organisations. For this, he offers two explanations. He believes that proponents of political violence find a larger audience when unpopular regimes cannot be overthrown through the democratic method.

Desperate individuals are prepared to die and kill for what they and others think is a good cause when systemic socioeconomic injustices are left unchecked. The negative link between civil freedoms and terrorism is demonstrated by various econometric research, including those by Krueger and Laitin (2008) and Lee (2005), and is consistent with Schmid's theorem. According to Dowd and Lind (2015), the use of repressive measures to quell rebellion results in violent outcomes and that modern violence in sub-Saharan Africa is a result of historical grievances with states that have not addressed alienation and insecurity that have grown over

time. Others, though, are in disagreement. This study will be guided by the following set of question:

i. What are the pros and cons of radicalization mitigation as a strategy for countering terrorism?

Conceptual Review

(i) Radicalization

Representatives, journalists, academics, and security professionals frequently utilise the idea of radicalization while reporting on terrorism and violent extremism. It is vital to make clear how certain talks are interpreted and applied to this research before moving on to other discussions. Other users don't all agree on a single definition for the words. The phrases "radicalization" and "de-radicalization," as Schmid (2013) correctly notes, are frequently used. However, what exactly is "radicalization," what causes it, and how can radicalization be called radical, violent extremism? To find out if it exists, a search is necessary. It's also a depressing experience if you're a terrorist (Schmid, 2013, p.1). For example, Ashour (2009, p. 4) argues that Radicalization is a relative phase of change in which a group experiences ideological and/or behavioural shifts that result in a rejection of democratic ideals (such as the legitimacy of peaceful power transitions and ideological and political pluralism), demands for revolutionary sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and cultural changes, and possibly the use of violence, or an upsurge in the levels of violence, to further political objectives. For Sodipo (2013, p. 4),

Radicalization is the process through which a person or organisation rejects the status quo, goes against contemporary ideas of the freedom of thought and speech, and adopts radical political, social, or religious goals that encourage violent ideologies. It's a procedure with a purpose, which includes carrying out terroristic deeds. Usually, a person's self-definition changes to signal the beginning of it. These shifts are reinforced by grievances, which frequently stem from individual or collective worries about regional problems and global events. According to Schmid (2013, p5), radicalization is described as a process that occurs on an individual or group level when one or both political actors and groups with divergent interests reject customary modes of communication, accommodation, and tolerance, typically in a political environment. Both sides of the disagreement are firmly dedicated to using combative conflict resolution strategies. This may include (i) coercion and (non-violent) coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism, or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. On the rebel side, the process typically involves ideological socialization from a mainstream or status quo-oriented position to a radical or extremist one, a binary worldview, and the adoption of an alternative focus for political mobilization outside the dominant political framework. This is because the old system is no longer perceived as adequate or legitimate. Although there is disagreement among academics on the meaning of the phrase, experts concur that this is a radicalization process. The causes of a person or group becoming radicalised are still up for dispute among specialists. Though there are numerous causes of radicalization, not all of them have been shown to exist. In other words, experts argue that a complex interplay of convergent and reinforcing elements rather than a single factor causes people or groups to become radicalized (Evans & Neumann, 2009; Kirby, 2007; Ferrero, 2005).

As a result, research on the causes of radicalization has come to the conclusion that the complex interaction of elements at the personal, external, and societal levels might be a deciding factor in one's ability to become radicalised (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008). External elements manifest independently of the person. People's environments are shaped and constrained by them, yet they have limited control over them. Political, economic, and cultural aspects make up external forces. Social factors refer to

mechanisms that place individuals in relation to others and can therefore include both in-groups and out-groups. Beutel (2007) identified four interrelated steps in the radicalization process: ii) religious inquiry in which individuals seek to understand issues from a religious perspective; iii) aligning frameworks in which new ideas, often of a radical nature, make sense to them and iv) socialization, which internalizes radical ideas so that people join extremist groups (Beutel, 2007).

While this process cannot fully explain the plight of all radicalized individuals and Islamic groups, it sheds light on how young people in the West and elsewhere in the world are radicalized. When someone becomes radicalised, they begin to hold extreme opinions and, in certain situations, join terrorist organisations or commit terroristic crimes. It can be driven by a variety of things, such as ideas, religious convictions, political ideologies, and biases towards certain racial or ethnic groups. Radicalizers are recruiting and persuading susceptible individuals online. On social media, private messaging services, gaming platforms, and forums, they upload extreme and frequently violent photos, messages, speeches, and films to do this. They deliberately propagate bogus news that has been made to prey on people's anxieties and vulnerabilities as one of their many recruitment strategies. They'll also try to embellish news reports, such as those regarding unemployment or homelessness, in order to create their own narrative (Esposito and John 1997).

(ii) Understanding the Notion of Counter-Terrorism

The protection of liberal democracy and the rule of law should be the first priority of any anti-terrorism strategy, according to Wilkinson (1977, p1), who places this objective above any attempts to eradicate terrorism and political violence. The phrase "offensive measures taken to counter terrorist acts, including the gathering of information and threat analysis in support of those measures" is used to define counterterrorism according to Elledge (2021, p8), a counterterrorism operation is much more than just a raid or rescue. Intelligence gathering, force planning, interagency coordination, and special logistical requirements. are all ongoing processes.

Contrary to anti-terrorism, which is defensive, counter-terrorism typically adopts an offensive stance. The DOD uses anti-terrorism as a defensive tactic to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel, dependents, facilities, and equipment to terrorist acts. It is a preventative measure used to thwart terrorist attacks or lessen their effects. Both counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures—the terms are frequently used interchangeably—are put in place to address the threat of terrorism. Elledge's definition (2021), which incorporates all essential elements of counterterrorism, is used for this study. The foundation for developing successful counter-terrorism policies when it comes to counter-terrorism strategies is a thorough understanding of the seriousness of the terrorist threat.

Three anti-terrorism tactics have emerged over time (Makinda, 2006, p. 9). The standard approach depends on gathering information, carrying out investigations, making arrests, and filing charges. This does not deal with the fundamental causes of terrorism. However, it was successful in keeping terrorism under control in a number of nations, including Germany, Italy, and India (Makinda, 2006). In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, some contend that this strategy was a failure. However, they omit to mention that the attacks' success was facilitated by the US intelligence agencies' failure to share information. The US carried out significant countermeasures before the attacks were fully investigated.

According to the institutional approach, institutions can reduce the likelihood of terrorism because they have control over the behavior of actors, including governments and terrorists. These institutions include traditional and religious ones, as well as the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and the laws, procedures, and standards that control them. Without

institutions, there won't be any sense of safety, justice, or order. Policymakers must develop strategies for promoting these institutions that restrict the use of violence and offer protection from all forms of abuse if they are to encourage people to use their abilities for positive purposes. Potential terrorists can have their mindsets altered by these institutions.

This view point implies that the development and social justice approaches both emphasize increased public participation in the management of their economic, political, cultural, and social affairs. Equitable distribution of wealth, income, social benefits, and necessities like secure housing, access to clean water, and healthcare can reduce the likelihood of terrorism. They will assist in facilitating empowerment while also removing factors that contribute to political unrest. This study concludes that none of these tactics can be effective on their own. By combining their efforts, they will create counterterrorism strategies that are very successful. The next section examines young people's pathological radicalization into violent extremism.

Interrogating Counter-Terrorism Measures in Nigeria

This section deductively discussed some existing counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria which include intelligence gathering, force planning, inter-agency coordination, and special logistical needs. Legal measures, multilateral efforts, and international cooperation are some of the counterterrorism measures implemented in Nigeria so far:

(i) Legal Measures:

This study reveals that the EFCC Act deals with cases of persons who fund terrorism and the punishment for such act is life imprisonment. Similarly, cases of terrorism are being treated under the Criminal Code. Suspects are charged for kidnapping, treason and treasonable felony, sedition, subversive activities and membership of unlawful society by the police. Ralph Uwazuruike, the leader of MASSOB whose men have been carrying out terrorist activities in the South Eastern part of the country is being charged under the Criminal Code. If Nigeria had anti-terrorism law, Uwazuruike would have been properly charged under that law. Some of the suspects are however charged under both the EFCC and the Criminal Code Act for offences that are purely terrorism, as a result of the confusion caused by the absence of appropriate anti-terrorism law.

The bodies involved in the fight against terrorism are the Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police, DSS, EFCC, the National Intelligence Agency, the Immigration and Customs Services. All existing laws deal with various aspects of terrorism, with the EFCC, the police and DSS prosecuting the aspects each feels fall under its jurisdiction. An arrangement of this nature does not convey the gravity of the offence and encourages inter-agency rivalry which could render coordination less effective.

The punishment for funding terrorism is life in prison under the EFCC Act. Likewise, the Criminal Code governs how cases of terrorism are handled. The police accuse suspects of kidnapping, treason and treasonable felonies, sedition, subversive activities, and membership in an illegal organization. Under the Criminal Code, charges are being brought against Ralph Uwazuruike, the leader of MASSOB, whose followers have been engaged in terrorist activity in the country's South Eastern region. Uwazuruike would have been charged in accordance with Nigeria's anti-terrorism law. However, due to the confusion brought on by the lack of an effective anti-terrorism law, some of the suspects are accused of crimes that fall under both the purview of the EFCC and the Criminal Code Act.

Armed Forces, Nigeria Police, DSS, EFCC, National Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs Services, and National Security Service are the organizations actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. All currently enacted laws address various facets of terrorism,

with the EFCC, the police, and the DSS each prosecuting facets they deem to be within their purview. This kind of arrangement fails to convey the seriousness of the offense and promotes rivalry between agencies, which may reduce the efficiency of coordination.

(ii) **Multi-Lateral Efforts:**

This study is of the view that it is important to remember that most of Nigeria's anti-terrorist efforts are based on and situated within UN and AU resolutions. Among them are the UN Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1371 of 2001, and 1373 (2001) on measures against the Taliban, terrorism financing, and terrorist activities, as well as other Resolutions on Individuals and Entities Associated with Al-Qaeda and Taliban; the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering; the 2002 Plan of Action of the AU, which established the African Centre for the Research and Study on Terrorism; and the International Civil Aviation Organization Regulations. Nigeria has performed its duties under these multilateral agreements and made arrests in accordance with some UN Resolutions.

(iii) International Cooperation

The study reveals that Nigeria was the driving force behind the formation of the WAISEC, which only convened twice in 2003 and 2004 to discuss tactics for combating terrorism and other transnational crimes in the sub-region. An MOU was signed to improve security and intelligence cooperation, and the fight against terrorism was a top priority when Nigeria hosted the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa in 2005. In order to encourage the sharing of anti-terrorist intelligence, Nigeria has also taken advantage of its participation in the Trans-Sahara Defense Chiefs conference.

Pros of Countering Terrorism in Nigeria

There are obstacles the nation must overcome in order to prevent and combat terrorism. The challenges of terrorism and counterterrorism were highlighted during this chapter's section.

i) Inadequate security.

Security organizations are ill-equipped to monitor important infrastructure, such as pipelines, seaports, airports, and installations (Nwolise 2006; Ochoga 2020). In addition, security infrastructure at these ports falls short of international standards. Attacks like the bomb explosions at the Murtala Mohammed and Aminu Kano international airports, the Kaduna refinery, and pipeline vandalism have occurred as a result of inadequate security at these strategic locations. These incidents demonstrate the inadequate security at these strategic locations.

(ii) Slow Reaction to Agitations

Government's failure to act quickly enough to quell public dissent could result in acts that compromise national security and make things more difficult for security agencies. One reason for the Niger Delta crisis, in the view of this study, is that different governments have not responded to the agitation of Niger Delta residents over a number of years regarding their low level of development, unemployment, and poverty, among other issues (Adejo, 2020). The people's discontent is being expressed through actions that are dangerous to national security.

(iii)Insufficient Information

In the fight against terrorism, accurate intelligence is essential. People are frequently hesitant to share information either out of concern for intimidation or in support of terrorists. Since the militants are viewed as upholding justice in the Niger Delta and other section of the

country, the locals won't provide security personnel with any information. Security agencies are unable to stop terrorist activities due to inadequate information.

(iv) Lack of Sufficiently Trained Personnel

Law and order maintenance is the responsibility of the police, and crime detection and prevention through intelligence gathering and investigations is the responsibility of the intelligence community. None of these organizations have the specialized training needed to combat terrorism, especially in a hostile environment like that of Boko Haram and its off-shots –the violent headers, and armed bandits (Department of State Services, 2016). The deployment of Operation Flush to that area assumes that the police, whose official duty is to uphold law and order, lack the necessary training to handle the situation. The Army was sent to Odi in Bayelsa State for the same reason, where they used the greatest amount of force. However, Wardlaw (1982, p. 7) stated that "the army is unsuited, in terms of both training and doctrine, for an internal security role. It won't be necessary to send in the Army to provide internal security if the police receive the necessary training. An untrained security agent would find it challenging to pursue terrorists through creeks and uncleared waterways. The way the militants behave demonstrates that they have received professional training, not just basic training. Therefore, there is a problem that needs immediate attention: a lack of sufficient trained manpower.

(v)Issues with Technology

This study is of the view that the characteristics of terrorism have changed and been amplified as a result of technological advancements in communication and transportation. Terrorists can quickly and physically attack their targets. The use of the internet for these purposes includes communication, member recruitment, intelligence gathering, fund raising, organization, coordination of activities, and the dissemination of propaganda. Since the introduction of cell phones in Nigeria, communication has gotten much easier, and militants are taking advantage of this. It is now more difficult for security agencies to track down and penetrate the terrorist network.

(vii) Misappropriation of Funds

Despite the insufficient funding, corruption and the misuse of funds intended for defense and counterterrorism are a serious problem. Evidently, the Dansuke Gate account of corruption in the defense industry comes to mind. Whereas Col. The administration of President Buhari detained Sambo Dansuke for years after he diverted money intended for counterterrorism to political causes.

The Cons of Counter-terrorism in Nigeria

The foundation for creating counterterrorism measures is an awareness of how serious the threat of terrorism is. Over the years, conflicting ideas about the success and failure of counterterrorism have developed in Nigeria. Ochoga(2020) asserts that relies on intelligence gathering, investigations, arrests, and prosecution as a starting point. This does not always address the underlying causes of terrorism. He thinks that there is a complex surrounding terrorism as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. Ochoga(2020) and other academics with similar ideologies ignore the fact that the attacks were made possible in part by the US Intelligence Agencies' failure to share information, which led to the attacks being possible. Before the attacks had a chance to be thoroughly investigated, the US took extensive counter measures. As a result, Nigeria must consider the effects of both non-military and military counterterrorism strategies.


With the understanding that institutions can lessen the likelihood of terrorism because they control the behavior of actors, including governments and terrorists, Nigeria has used this approach over the years. These institutions include traditional and religious institutions as well as the executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, as well as the laws, practices, and standards that govern them. There won't be any sense of order, security, or justice without institutions. This suggests that the Anti-terrorism Act's passage, the Nigerian National Security Strategy's review, and various poverty-reduction, youth, and women empowerment programs are institutional counterterrorism approaches. Therefore, despite the success of these initiatives, the challenge for policymakers is to come up with ways to support these institutions to reduce the use of violence and provide protection from all forms of abuse so that people can use their abilities for useful purposes. These institutions have the power to change the mindset of potential terrorists.

In order to promote social justice and human development, Nigeria's successive governments established institutional measures as a counterterrorism mechanism in addition to suppression tactics. The Nigerian Government's Trade-moni, Anchor Borrowers Scheme, Sure-P, Em-Power, as well as other poverty reduction and economic empowerment programmes, which began in 2009, were all designed to increase the people's involvement in the management of their economic, political, cultural, and social affairs. The likelihood of terrorism can be decreased through the equitable distribution of wealth, income, social benefits, and basic necessities like safe shelter, clean water, and medical facilities. These initiatives aimed to promote empowerment while also removing the factors that lead to political unrest. But according to this study, none of these strategies can be successful on their own. All of them working together will result in very effective counterterrorism measures.

Answering the Research Question and Discussion of Findings

This analysis of the literature has shown that the military's leadership was changed, it was cleaned up, and the branch was freed of its pervasive corruption as the first action of each succeeding government. Within a few months, the army had liberated hundreds of Boko Haram prisoners and driven the terrorist organization out of the majority of its strongholds. Refugees who had to flee the violence are returning home. The group nonetheless keeps sending suicide bombers into towns and cities. One of the infamous Chibok girls has been found, but the other four are still missing. Thus, since 2009, terrorist attacks on Nigerians have trended in Figure 1.1. 3,421 terrorist attacks were reported across the nation. According to the graph, the number was highest in 2014 and the lowest in 2009. Terrorist attacks increased steadily from 20.6% in 2009 to 36.6% in 2014 to 65.9% in 2022. Many of these attacks were targeted at Nigerian interests within the nation.

Figure 1.1: Terrorist Attacks against Nigeria since 2009



Source: Wukari International Studies Group (2023), and constructed by the author

The battle against terrorism has not yet been won, despite the many victories the Nigerian government has achieved. According to this study, radicalization has significantly affected Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy since 2009. The information in table 4.1 has demonstrated the terrorists' ongoing tenacity in Nigeria. This suggests that the military counterterrorism strategies used by the Nigerian government have not produced any notable results. This submission is consistent with studies by Ochoga (2022), Eze (2019), Uba (2015), and others. Even though the nation chose a de-radicalization strategy at one point by granting amnesty to the terrorists, the move had little impact. In other words, counterterrorism strategies such suppression and de-radicalization have proven to be ineffective in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, this study believes that there are underlying causes for the resilience of terrorist groups in Nigeria and the recruitment of new members, which renders counterterrorism ineffective. This study's perspective differs from that of Ochoga (2022), Eze(2022), and Uba's (2022) studies. Therefore, the study rejects the null hypothesis stating that; radicalization has no significant impact on counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria.

Thus, this study holds that multiculturalism has emerged as a potent force shaping social order, especially in heterogeneous societies, throughout the world. It does this by examining the counterproductive effects of counterterrorism's efforts to de-radicalize and radicalize less in Nigeria. On the one hand, it is a common belief that effective management of the racial and cultural diversity that define multicultural societies will create the conditions for understanding, cooperation, integration, and the eradication of racism. The pursuit of social justice, the acceptance of identities, and the appreciation of diversity will all be encouraged by this development, which will also boost economic growth and have a positive effect on nation-building. These qualities demonstrate that multiculturalism is a policy that tends to encourage equality, justice, and social cohesion among the various ethnic and cultural groups residing in a location. However, multiculturalism has also been held responsible by some for a number of real or imagined social ills, including ethnic enclaves, youth violence, nepotism, and favoritism. The argument that multiculturalism has failed to address the fundamental

issues of social, economic, and political exclusion, possibly leading to social isolation, was also advanced. The most common justifications for the wrongdoing connected to multiculturalism's practices center on the fact that it promotes prejudice, injustice, and discrimination—which frequently manifest as expressions of cultural differences and ultimately cause alienation—and that these behaviors are often expressed in ways that are unfair and discriminatory.

These divergent points of view provide the framework for talking about the potential for multiculturalism to breed terrorism. Multiculturalism's importance and its detractors were discussed in this study. It is crucial to remember that the policy frameworks put in place to manage multicultural groups in societies are the root of the multiculturalism problems. The Boko Haram insurgency that plagues the northeast served as a case study for diagnosing Nigeria's multicultural experiences. Since there are many factors contributing to Boko Haram, it is reasonable to claim that the federal character principle, which was intended to address Nigeria's multiculturalism, was politicized in order to foster ethnic and religious sentiments. This, in turn, led to structural issues that contributed to youth involvement in Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. The structural issues resulting from this were manifested as corruption, marginalization, and discrimination, among other things. This submission is rooted in the ideological metaphor of the Relative Deprivation Theory. The manifestations of injustice, deprivations, illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty are the long-term effects of these issues. Therefore, making the claim that structural issues in Nigeria were caused by the methods used to address the multicultural identity is appropriate. As a result, it is possible to connect the structural issues brought on by national policies designed to manage the country's multicultural identity with the causes of terrorism.

Conclusion

The study concludes that neither the prevention of radicalization nor its occurrence has had a materially negative impact on Nigeria's efforts to combat terrorism. It was noted that there are currently implemented measures, including legal restrictions, multilateral initiatives, and international cooperation. The study found that these counterterrorism definitions' requirements are not being met by these measures, and they are also failing to achieve their intended objectives. As a result, it suggested fresh approaches to handle the problems mentioned earlier. The goal of this study was to evaluate terrorism and counterterrorism in order to suggest strategies for doing so while also bolstering national security. According to the study, there have been political, economic, and social changes in Nigeria over the years that have in some way or another led to acts that have been classified as terrorism. As a result, some of Nigeria's most important strategies are briefly discussed below considering their pros and cons.

Discussion Strategy: Discussion is essential for resolving problems that lead to conflict, violence, and terror. The "Dutch Option" is this. Democracies that permit opposing viewpoints are more in need of this tactic. People who feel oppressed and dominated, as well as "dissidents," "terrorists," and other groups, should be given the chance to express their opinions. In order to reach out to terrorists in various situations, Nigeria has occasionally used this de-radicalization strategy. The plan for freeing terrorists who have been detained and arrested includes the Nigerian government offering them scholarships for higher education abroad. However, the tactic was pointless because it only strengthened their fortitude.

Monitoring Strategy: The Nigerian government has improved security monitoring at airports, seaports, and land borders to better identify terrorists and their operational equipment. To

perform their duties more effectively, the security officers at these ports and borders received the necessary training and monitoring equipment. Those who employ terrorist tactics as well as organizations are trained to keep an eye out for pertinent information. But Nigerian terrorism continues to thrive.

Building an international coalition to combat terrorism was necessary.The fight against terrorism is seen as having a crucial role for international cooperation. This was carried out in Nigeria in order to ratify all international terrorism treaties, particularly extradition treaties. Coordination was shown in the areas of shared intelligence gathering and information sharing on studies and findings related to counterterrorism. Even though a military multilateral task force for the Lake Chad region was established, Nigerian terrorism persists.

Resource Strategy: In 2004, 2014, and 2019, the Nigerian government chose a human strategy to combat terrorism. The government believed that ensuring justice in the distribution of their national resources, including political positions, would reduce terrorism and overall insecurity. This national policy goal was to prevent groups from turning to terrorism as a form of protest against political dominance. The government recognized the need for justice in the distribution of resources among the various regions of the nation, especially in reducing poverty. As a result, the nation has had a number of poverty reduction programs since 2009, but terrorism in Nigeria persists. Therefore, the political angle as a recipe for fostering and providing resistance to terrorism in Nigeria needs to be examined. Both the suppression and de-radicalization mitigation strategies have filed to yield significant impact in counterterrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, the study rejects the null hypothesis that; radicalization has no significant impact on counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria.

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