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ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS; LESSON FOR NIGERIA

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Abstract
Religion-inspired terrorism has become a defining challenge of the twenty-first century, which has far-reaching consequences regarding national, regional, and global security. Nigeria has faced persistent violence from Boko Haram, whose operations have surpassed earlier religious riots in scope and complexity The problem lies in the lack of policy reactions, both internationally and locally, to address the complexity of religious terrorism. This paper aimed to assess Nigeria's policy responses to religious terrorism within the broader global strategies of counterterrorism. The paper used a qualitative method of analysis, where it reviewed literature on government policies on addressing religious induced violent crimes and terror. The paper is theoretically guided by Archibugi and Young's (2002) classificatory schema of "Statist" and "Cosmopolitan" frames of interpretation, along with the theory of securitization by Buzan, Waefer and de Wille (1998). It was revealed that while global responses to religious terrorism was pushed basically by 9/11 Al-Qaeda attack on the United States, Nigerian governments' strategies towards ending religious terrorism remained inconsistent, reactive and heavily militarised. The strategies have failed to address the fundamental ideological and structural drivers of terrorism. This paper concludes that religious terrorism resists negotiation and compromise due to its absolutist ideological view, making dialogue mostly unsuccessful. It was therefore recommended that the federal government of Nigeria adopts a multi-pronged strategy: combining robust law enforcement, enhanced intelligence gathering, international collaboration and targeted socio-economic interventions to weaken extremist recruitment. Such broad measures would strengthen resilience against terrorism while reducing reliance on military responses alone.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Global Security, Government Policies, Religious Terrorism, Violent Conflicts

Introduction
Events experienced around the globe have shown that the greatest threat to the future of the world today may not be nuclear weapons, military coups or any pandemic or endemic diseases but religion and religious differences which have spawned a form of terrorism with death tolls surpassing the total casualties of the two tragedies of our modern history – the World Wars I and II. Today, world history is replete of misplaced and misguided passions

that have produced such historical monstrosities and atrocities as the Crusaders, the Inquisition, ethnic cleansing and the horror of the Holocaust. This trend has not dissipated but rather has gathered momentum under Islamic motivated terrorism. The exacerbation of this form of terrorism has led to an inquiry as to why religion is so powerful and controlling. Why is it more powerful than all other phenomena before it – politics, military arms and scientific advancement? The answer lies in that religion is not just a social, cultural, political or ideological phenomenon but rather incorporates all of them within itself. Religion finds its power and motivating force in the personal chambers of the soul, the inner mind of the individual. It is within the soul of man that we find that private motivation that informs and forms perceptions and modify behaviour. Experience has shown that man is more willing to die for the sake of his religion and religious beliefs than for any political, social or ideological reason.

Religion is as old as mankind with its roots firmly embedded in the inner recesses of the human spirit. Every culture or civilisation, no matter how old or recent, has developed some form of religious belief systems and practices that fill and satisfy the vacuum in the pit of the human soul crying out for reason, purpose and significance for existence in this world. This is evident from the ancient etchings and carvings on the walls of caves to the grand archaeological findings of monuments which testify to attempts of man seeking to find himself and make sense of his world (Craig et al 2009, McKay et al 2007). Man's travails through this world have produced a tapestry of religious practices and ideologies that only serve to create more problems than they solve.

Nigeria has had before now her own share of religious 'riots' which had burned briefly with the usual loss of life and property but quickly expired, either with the leaders of such religious conflagration arrested or killed. However, a defining characteristic of these 'riots' were either that they were internal (or intra-religion); that is, directed at other Muslim sects who were considered *kafirs* or unbelievers as was the case between the Izala in Zuru and the Darika in Sokoto state, or external (or inter-religion); that is, such as were directed at people of other religions (such as Christians) (Albert 2004). Among the most notable of such inter-religious and intra-religious 'riots' (as popularly termed by the media and politicians who seek to downplay such acts of religious terrorism for their benefits) were the Kaduna Polytechnic religious riot (1988), the Katsina revolt of 1991, the Bauchi religious conflict of 1991, the Kano and Jalingo upheavals of 1991 and 1992, the Zango-Kataf crisis of 1992, the Funtua uprising of 1993 and the most notorious Maitatsine riot of 1980, the 1982 Fagge crisis, the Reinhard Boonke riot of 1991 and the Akaluka incident of 1994 (Ukanah 2011, Albert 2004).

Boko Haram has surpassed all the other groups and acts of religious terrorism ever experienced in Nigeria in its tenacity, reach, sophistication and modus operandi. This is not surprising when one recognises the fact that al Qaeda (The Base), has lived up to its name and its modus operandi has become the basis for other religious sects and religiously motivated terrorism. Boko Haram as an active terrorist organisation has links with the Taliban from which it derives active logistic, monetary and other supports and by extension an affiliate of al Qaeda. This partly explains the unprecedented dimensions, when compared with earlier cases, to which Boko Haram has carried its operations such as kidnapping and abductions, targeted assassinations and mass killings of innocent villagers and the wanton destructions of villages. Perhaps the most appalling tactic but which is not surprising seeing that its precursors; Hamas and Al Qaeda have perfected it to a state-of-the-art technique, is suicide bombing. While this is novel to the Nigerian terrain and experience, as part of an asymmetric war, its root can be traced to antiquity (Armstrong 2007, Gere 2007).

To achieve its set objective, this paper applied a qualitative documentary and comparison policy analysis approaches. The analysis of peer-reviewed academic sources, government regulations of Nigeria and governmental statements on policy and globally

accepted anti-terrorism frameworks was thematically undertaken. The sources of information were evaluated to determine areas of policy implementation gaps and locus of cooperation. It is an interpretive, critical approach whose purpose is to assess the consistency between the stated policy goals and reported results.

Literature Review

Terrorism suffers from what Pillar (2001, p. 5) has called a "collective definitional angst". Exasperated, Laqueur (1977, p. 79) has concluded that "any definition of political terrorism venturing beyond noting the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or threats of such acts towards achieving political ends is bound to lead to endless controversy." Hence, he submits that "it can be predicted with confidence that the disputes about a comprehensive, detailed definition of terrorism will continue for a long time, that they will not result in a consensus and that they will make no notable contribution toward the understanding of terrorism."

However, the term is popularly used among scholars to imply "the indiscriminate use or threat of violence to advance social, political, economic, or religious objectives by creating a climate of fear" (Shimko 2008, p. 319). Although the coinage of the term has been traced to the French Revolution from where it has acquired its initial meaning as a "revolutionary or anti-government activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities," (Hoffman 2006), its close link with the virtue and democracy has been alluded to by Maximilien Robespierre, a leading ideologue of the French Revolution, who argued that virtue without terror is evil and terror without virtue is helpless. He has been quoted as saying that "terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue." (Palmer 1970, p. 126). However, since the time of the French Revolution, the meaning and definition of the concept has evolved over time. At one time it became a term associated with the abuse of office and power – with overt criminal implications (Laqueur 1987, p. 11), to becoming a euphemism for Carlo Pisacane's theory of "propaganda by deed" which means the selective targeting of specific individuals whom a group considered as the embodiment of the autocratic, oppressive state. It was later used to qualify the clandestine support, encouragement, and assistance provided by a foreign government to a terrorist group (state-sponsored terrorism).

By the 1930s, the concept acquired a new meaning; it was now used to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their leaders against their own citizens. By the late 1960s and 1970s, the emergence of nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside the colonial and neo-colonial frameworks as well as radical ideologically motivated organisations and disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities gave a new meaning to the concept. Terrorism became a means of drawing global attention to themselves and their respective causes, of attracting international sympathy and support.

In the early 1980s, terrorism became a calculated means to destabilise the West as part of a vast global conspiracy. Terrorism, therefore, acquired a characteristic as a type of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution (Jenkins 1983, pp. 13-13, 1985, pp. 19-20). The early 1990s further brought new dimension to the use of the concept to include "narco-terrorism," defined as the "use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organisations" (Ehrenfeld 1990). The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in the United States inevitably led to the redefinition of terrorism and the introduction of religion as a major factor in its consideration.

Apart from compounding and confusing its definition, the different trajectories of terrorism have really made it possible to talk of many 'terrorisms' (Laqueur 2003). However, in relation to defining the concept, Jenkins (1980, p. 2) has argued that terrorism should be defined "by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their

cause." Despite this attempt at harmonising the definitions, two classes of people most interested in terrorism are still not agreed as to its real meaning. The first are the government policymakers and their security forces such as the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the US Department of Defence which have variously come up with what can be termed as official definitions. The second are scholars some of whom thought a distinction between terrorism and other forms of insurgencies would help in understanding the concept (Beckett 2001, p. xiii, Merari 2004, pp. 12-51, Laqueur 1971, p. xi). Other scholars have attempted to give a straight definition. For instance, Hoffman defines terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change" (Hoffman 2006).

However, while political terrorism may be straight forward in its conceptualisation, the emergence of the religious factor has not made the conceptualisation of terrorism any easier; rather it has led to the further obfuscation of the term. Generally, scholars are agreed that in any understanding of terrorism, three components are essential. First is that it involves the use of or threat of violence, thereby emphasising physical violence as a defining feature. Second is that the violence must be carried out in furtherance of some broader political or social objective. Third is that it does not matter who the victims are basically because "terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victims or objects of the terrorist attack" (Hoffman 2006). The targets of terrorist attacks are random, and it is this randomness that creates fear. Combs (2003, p. 10), reflecting the consensus on these three points, define terrorism as "involving an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims and political goals or motives."

A lot of controversies and debate had been generated at the onset of the Boko Haram debacle as to whether it was just a religious insurgence or a terrorist group. This debate has even compared it with other ethno-nationalist groupings of which there are many in Nigeria. The failure of the government to react adequately and immediately to the threats of Boko Haram was partly as a result of this inability of the policymakers to grasp the basic fact that there is a great difference between political and religious insurgencies and particularly also the fault of the media who insisted on calling Boko Haram activities of murder and pillaging as religious riots or unrest, terms that trivialised and undermined the dastardly acts being perpetrated on the people. The government's lack of political will and failure to react ennobled the group, made them invincible, untouchable and popular, thereby garnering support for them among the local people. It further enables them to spread across most of the big cities and urban centres in the northeast and north central of the country, with sympathisers in almost every towns and cities. The government's recalcitrance further allowed the group the opportunity needed to effectively armed and store arsenal and ordnances and formed linkages with other external but similar groups such as the Taliban, al Qaeda and Al Shabab in the East African region.

This leads us to Hoffman's (2006, p. 43) definition that terrorism is something conducted by a "subnational group of non-state entity." This raises a new issue whether terrorism should be defined simply by the nature of the act or also by the nature of the group and whether states that actively sponsor terrorism should be excluded. While this may seem innocuous, it is actually important recognising the significant differences these portend as they are critical to shaping policy responses. To the point that they employ terrorist tactics of asymmetric warfare, indiscriminate killing, and kidnapping, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), PLO, al Qaeda, Boko Haram and Aum Shinrikyo of Japan can all be considered as terrorist organisations but the basic difference amongst them lies in their motives, goals and objectives as well as types of terrorist attacks committed. The distinction lies in that nationalist or separatist (political groups) like the IRA have tended to calibrate their use of violence, using enough to rivet world attention but not so much as to alienate supporters abroad and members of their base community. whereas, al Qaeda, as symbolic of other

religious groups, has much more expansive political and social goals that are deeply infused with and motivated by religious fundamentalism.

The difference between political and religious terrorism becomes clear when one considers the fact that the IRA for instance, has no desire to destroy Great Britain, it merely wanted to get the attention of the world and get the British out of Ireland, while apocalyptic religious groups are not constrained by any standard of decency and rule of war (Armstrong 2007). Thus, it behoves us at this point to distinguish between political and religious terrorisms as our concern is primarily with religious terrorism. Failure to understand this differentiation has led to muddling up policy responses by proposing similar counterinsurgency responses to both.

Analysts must recognise that religious terrorism is different from other types or forms of struggles, basically because, first, while other types of struggles or terrorism attempt to find conclusions within the lifetimes of the perpetrators, religious struggles or terrorism can and do outlive their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. Second, targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military values but rather, they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness. The constant recourse to a 'God' to justify their action has the power of 'satanizing' the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism 'godly'. As Juergensmeyer (2004, pp. 34-38) has noted, this is a kind of "perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war." The effect of this, as he had also noted, is "not so much that religion has become politicised, but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles" (Juergensmeyer 2004).

Third, the targets of religious terrorism and violence also have the tendency to assume and acquire a similar religious mien or attitude, explanation and perspective. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US public and its leaders became more religious and God-minded. The then US President, George Bush whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the image of America's "righteous cause" as combating and bringing to an end the "absolute evil" of its enemies. Fourth, the 'divine' nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between good and bad, truth and evil, the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists, all ruled out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful negotiated truce. Fifth, the spiritual dimension of the war makes it to go beyond the confines of human law and ideal of morality. Society's laws are subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existent or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. In this case, there is no need to comply with society's laws and limitations when one is obeying a 'higher' authority. Sixth and finally, the end result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who often times are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life. Their efforts become conscious attempts at ennoblement and empowerment. Such efforts would have been poignant if they were not so destructive. These six points illustrate facets of terrorism that governmental, non-governmental, local and international actors must take into account in order to effectively tackle the menace of Boko Haram terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted a dual theoretical approach drawing on Archibugi and Young's (2002) classificatory schema of Statist and Cosmopolitan frames of interpretation, alongside Securitisation Theory as developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998). Archibugi and Young (2002) affirmed that there are two conceptualists in terrorism. The Statist frame conceptualises terrorism as a war against the state, thus authorising military

responses and actions by the state on its own. On the other hand, the Cosmopolitan frame considers terrorism as transnational criminality in which multilateral collaboration, compliance with international law, and long-term moves are necessary to pursue structural causes like inequality, poverty and political marginalisation. This two-pronged theory is crucial in clarifying how national responses are mediated by global policy orientations, with specific reference to Nigeria.

As a contribution to this, securitisation theory, as developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998), is utilised to explain how state actors can turn issues into matters of security by framing these issues as existential threats to national survival. After securitisation, extraordinary action is justified, whether this is emergency rule, mass surveillance, or a long-standing military campaign. In Nigeria, consecutive governments have securitised the insurgency of Boko Haram and presented it as a serious threat to the nation-state. This securitisation has legitimised the preponderance of militarised counter-terrorist actions, frequently at the cost of preventive, socio-economic or multilateral actions.

Combining these two views, this paper was able to shed light on the international policy setting (statist vs cosmopolitan orientations) as well as the internal political processes of constructing threat (securitisation). The two of them provide a formidable explanatory framework concerning the reasons why policies by the Nigerian government towards religious terrorism continue to be conservative, reactive, and inconsistent, even given the apparent necessity of more inclusive and preventative measures.

Governments' Policy Responses to Terrorism

What can be called a global response to terrorism and championed by the United States actually emerged as the aftermath of the post-September 11, 2001 debates about the appropriate way to understand and respond to contemporary terrorism. The recommendations emanating from the different debates have become the focus and direction of U.S. policy response to terrorism and these has been sold to its allies and the United Nations. Globally, it has become the acceptable approach to terrorism (Birkland, 2013; Jackson, 2007; Ucko, 2018; Freilich et al., 2024). This became necessary although terrorists were seen as transnational actors; that is, non-state actors engaged in activities across national boundaries. Although they are seen as non-state actors, terrorist organisations must still operate within states, their targets are often states, their objectives usually invoke changing state's policies, and their activities take place within the same international system in which states operate. Thus, since terrorism is a phenomenon that plays itself out in the context of the international system, then for any response to be adequate, it must also be international, taking into consideration the totality of the sub-systems that make up the international system. It is a form of international social conflict and so must be dealt with internationally (Cronin, 2011).

To simplify our responsibility here, we shall adopt and discuss the different external and internal government responses within Archibugi and Young's (2002) classificatory schema - "Statist" and "Cosmopolitan" frames of interpretation (Ó Guaire, 2024; Freilich et al., 2024). Each classification gives us differences in interpretation which are not merely technical but political and each implies different strategies of reaction. The Cosmopolitan interpretative framework conceptualises terrorist attacks as criminal acts requiring an international, multilateral response within the context of international law and organisations. It therefore advocates a long-term strategy that involves addressing the root causes of terrorism which it identified as including poverty, inequality and discontent (Held, 2004; Falk, 2003). The cosmopolitan framework decries the statist perspective which conceptualises terrorist attacks as acts of war (dexter, 2008). This was the initial response of the Bush administration after the September 11 incident and France's response after the Paris attack.

However, the statist perception that views terrorist attacks as acts of war or declaration of war is problematic because traditional wars are fought by military means and

amongst states and with definite endings. War carries with it the connotation of armed conflict between and amongst states whereas the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are non-state actors that are capable of inflicting damage like states in conventional wars. A major problem of this conception is that it brings with it policies and responses that may be inappropriate to combating terrorism (Stavro & Welch, 2023; Ó Guaire, 2024). Thus, the alternative is to view terrorist attacks as criminal acts, thereby leading to law enforcement strategy instead of a military model of outright confrontational war (Freilich et al., 2024). In spite of the fact that the military model seems more popular and accepted, it basically conflicts with the law enforcement strategy of the cosmopolitan perspective (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008).

It is in this respect that Nigeria received offers of assistance from France, China, and Canada in addition to those of the United States, Britain and Israel. States that are equally susceptible to invasion by Boko Haram as a result of sharing borders with Nigeria and having large Muslim populations who may be sympathetic to Boko Haram and perhaps offer them safe harbour. Cameroon, Republic Benin, Chad and Niger, have also declared war on the insurgents at an international summit hosted in Paris by French President, Francoise Hollande (Vanguard, Monday May 19, 2015). Expanding the sub-regional support and shrinking the space of support for the Boko Haram insurgents, the ECOWAS chairman and President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama also promised to invoke the relevant sections of its Joint Counter-Terrorist Strategy at the opening of the 1st Ordinary Session of the 3rd Legislature of the ECOWAS Parliament in Abuja. He was quoted as saying that "any destabilisation of Nigeria would be a destabilisation of the entire sub-region" (Vanguard Tuesday, May 20, 2015).

Conceptualising terrorist attacks as crimes against humanity and not merely against the state under attack, implies the establishment of an international tribunal with the authority to seek out, extradite, or arrest and try those identified as either terrorists or as having affiliation with terrorist organisations as either sympathisers or supporters. In this wise, states are expected to refrain from any unilateral and precipitous military action, but that states in the international system must create a unified international coalition that can bring terrorists to justice. Deriving from this perspective, all terrorists and their organisations will be classified as international criminal organisations and the full range of international law will be brought to bear in order to put them out of business. The catch to this is that international legal and law enforcement agencies such as Interpol and other institutions are not as well developed as the domestic ones. This implies that individual state's internal law enforcement institutions will still be relied upon and their cooperation cannot be guaranteed especially in such nations as are classified as favouring terrorists and providing for them safe havens. Such nations as classified by America include Syria, Cuba, South Korea, Libya, and Afghanistan. However, according to Shimko 2008, p. 325), international legal responses directed at people and organisations involved in terrorist acts are something of "a bandage approach that deals with the problem of terrorism after harm has already been done."

Finally, those advocating for the cosmopolitan response are also unequivocal on the need to address the deeper causes of terrorism. The argument is hinged on the belief that if the root causes of terrorism can be eliminated then terrorism will have no bases to survive anymore. But the problem which the advocates of this approach have not been able to overcome is identifying what the root causes of terrorism are. This, once again, leads us to the issue of the different types or forms of terrorisms. However, on a more general level, the root causes of terrorism have been located as including poverty, economic inequality and a profound sense of frustration and deprivation. This is why Diamond (2002, p. 101) has offered a rather simplistic solution that "we must feed the hands that could bite us" in order to stop terrorism. In the same vein, others have identified different root causes such as "the creation of a more peaceful and just world order [which] implies changes in political, economic and social institutions (Archibugi & Young 2002)." As a policy thrust, Karon

(2001, p. 18), has argued that "in the long run, eliminating the root causes of terror will involve, if not complete democracy, at least allowing the citizens of [Middle Eastern] countries some voice in their governance."

Interestingly, others have also come up with what we shall call the historical-contemporary event root cause of modern religious terrorism. The term 'Islam' connotes more than fourteen centuries of history, a billion and a third people, and a religious and cultural tradition of enormous diversity. Islam actually became prominent and represented the leading civilisation in the world during the interlude between the decline of the ancient civilisation of Greece and Rome and the rise of modern western civilisation of Europe. Historically, the rise of European civilisation eclipsed the prominence of Islam, hence the tendency among Muslims to see Western civilisation and all its trappings as evil and America as its bastion (Lewis 2003, p. 7, 2002).

This tendency had always been reflected in many of the pronouncements made by Osama bin Ladin, especially in his videotape of October 7, 2001, where he alluded to the "humiliation and disgrace" that Islam has suffered for "more than eighty years." Like every nation or religion, the Muslim peoples are aware of their history, they are shaped by it and their awareness dates back to the advent of Islam. Islam, as far back as the time of Muhammed, developed a strong interface between it and the state with Muhammed assuming the headship of both, thereby uniting them under one inseparable authority. As Lewis (2003, 2002) has noted, "religious truth and political power were indissolubly associated: the first sanctified the second, the second sustained the first." While the idea of a nation based on religion may seem anachronistic, it is not so to Islam and its adherents. Thus, as Lewis (2003, p. 3) has further observed, "it is difficult to generalise about Islam" primarily because "in one sense it denotes a religion, a system of belief and worship; in the other, the civilisation that grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion."

On the other hand, are the fundamentals of the belief system of Islam which require certain obligations from the adherents. For instance, radical Islamism or fundamentalists hold on tenaciously to the Islamic law which stipulates that it is lawful to wage war against four types of enemies; infidels, apostates, rebels and bandits (Lewis 2003, p. 31). Of these four types of wars, only the first two are legitimate and hence qualify as jihad or 'holy war.' The jihad is therefore commonly interpreted as armed struggle for the defence or advancement of Muslim power and as such is understood only in the military sense. Of equal importance is also the division of the world into two – *dar al-Islam* (the House of Peace) and *dar al-Harb* (the House of War) and the Muslim injunction to wage perpetual war against the latter until either they are converted to Islam or totally eliminated. It was on this point that on 12 October, 1996, bin Laden declared a jihad against the United States and two years later put his name to a *fatwa,* a decree to all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies everywhere. In a *Time Magazine,* interview in 1999, he further reiterated that "it would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims (Whittaker 2002, p. 10). This is the injunction which has been internationalised by al Qaeda's ideology and from which all contemporary terrorist cells such as Boko Haram and Al Shabab have taken their cue and justification (Agara 2011, 2021).

The corollary to the cosmopolitan approach is the statist interpretive framework which views terrorist attacks as acts of war and assumes that the most effective strategy for combating terrorism must be a universal declaration of war against terrorists and terrorism globally and also putting pressures on those states that actively support or passively tolerate terrorist organisations by providing haven to them. This approach frames terrorists' attacks as declaration of war and as Pomerantz has stated that "the fundamental problem is that international terrorism is not only a crime. It is also, for all intents and purposes, an act of war, and [every country] needs to treat it as such" (Pomenrantz 1998, p. 14). This perception of terrorist attacks as a call for arms and war against the attacked state implies significantly a

more aggressive diplomatic posture and government response. This is reminiscence of the Realist School and as Krauthammer (2001) has argued, it is not a war of choice where losing is an option, but a war that was brought directly to the attacked state's doorstep and therefore, losing is not an option. Losing is fatal. There is no time for restraint and other niceties. Once declared, the war against terrorism signifies a time for righteous might.

The critical difference between cosmopolitan and statist approaches may seem conflictual and contradictory, but in fact the difference is more in the emphasis and general predispositions of proponents on the two sides. For instance, while the statist would not argue against the leaders of Boko Haram being caught and brought before the courts for justice to prevail, they would rather not want international legal and organisational avenues be pursued as primarily but only as supplementary components of a military anti-terrorist strategy and policy. To view legal options as substitute to war against terrorism is to seriously limit the possibility of finding an end to terrorists' activities. While legal avenues and criminal justice systems may be a viable option in the domestic arena of each state, however, at the international level, the legal and criminal justice system have not been fully developed with the corresponding agencies and institutions. This failure leaves each state with no option than to go about prosecuting the war against terrorism the best way they can, that is, the military way. Even the international police system such as Interpol would need much intelligence gathering and information which remains in the hands of the national law enforcement bodies of each state that may or may not want to share it with them. The reality is that it is difficult to craft an effective global strategy against terrorism in a world of sovereign states.

Conclusion

In devising means to fight terrorism, it would be useful to understand the forces that drive them. A profound implication that emerges from the reality of religious terrorism is the ineffectuality of dialogue and political compromise. If a terrorist organisation has as its aim, the destruction of secular, liberal civilisation and non-adherents to their brand of religious belief, then it would be foolish, naive and unrealistic to suggest that any concession or change of policy will reduce the threat or bring to an end such terrorists' activity. While this may probably work with political terrorists but religious terrorists are not interested in negotiation or truce or compromise because by the tenets of their beliefs, there cannot be any truce between 'good' and 'evil'. Of equal importance is that policymakers and government should also realise that Muslims view Islam not only as a matter of faith and practice, but also as an identity and a loyalty. For fundamentalists, Islam or the Muslim religion is an identity and a loyalty that transcends all others. Hence, Muslims may not refer to themselves as Arab or Persian or Turkish or even Nigerians, they might rather identify themselves as Muslims. In the same vein, those perceived as non-Muslims are not seen in territorial or national terms but are referred to collectively as infidels (Kafirs). The wider implication therefore is that the war against infidels, and as such against religious terrorism cannot be territorially limited. It is a universal war. It is a war in defence of modern statism and democracy, and this is the essence of the need for a universal bonding against religious terrorism.

Of equal importance is the argument that poverty and unemployment have causal relationship with religious terrorism. While we may concede that this may be true of political terrorism, certainly not with religious terrorism. As Pipes (2000/2001, p. 21) has amplified, "it is the clash, not the cash" that is the motivating factor. This reductionist tendency to reduce almost everything to the battle between wealth and poverty is highly symptomatic of Western materialism and capitalist tendency to trivialise a fundamental issue. We reject the Liberal inclination to view social conflict as an outgrowth of social, economic and political conditions that can be altered in a manner that will eliminate the conflict. Michael Howard, as quoted by Pipes (2000/2001), has equally argued that religious terrorism "is not the problem of poverty as against wealth. It is a far more profound and intractable confrontation between a

theistic, land-based and traditional culture ... and the secular values of the Enlightenment." The focus on poverty and inequality as the root cause of religious terrorism as against political terrorism is too simplistic and not terribly useful for shaping meaningful policy response to it.

If the Nigerian policy makers are sincere and have the good will to find a lasting solution to this phenomenon, if certain people are not to feed and acquire wealth in the process of finding solution to this problem of incessant religious terrorism, then they should see it for what it is, a fundamental conflict between values and cultures, good and evil and conflicts along these fault lines are not resolved by dialogue or negotiation. As Hoffman (2006, p. 130) has noted; "the complexity, diversity and often idiosyncratic characteristics of religious terrorism imply that there is no "magic bullet" - no single solution - that can be applied to all cases. Yet this fact only reinforces the need for multiple creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least, to ameliorate both the underlying causes of religious terrorism and its violent manifestation.

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