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ARAB STRATEGIC OPTIONS POST-UNGA 2025: REFRAMING GAZA STRATEGY AMID NEW REGIONAL STABILITY DYNAMICS

Yusuf Abubakar Mamud
Baze University Abuja
ayusuf7323@gmail.com

Abstract
The Gaza crisis historically exposed the limitations of fragmented Arab state strategies, oscillating between confrontation and accommodation. Following the 2025 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and its "New York Declaration," which endorsed a Hamas-free governance framework, this study evaluated the strategic options available to Arab states to influence Gaza's trajectory. The research employed a qualitative methodology, including historical analysis, policy review, and scenario mapping, to assess pathways such as diplomatic statecraft, transitional governance, conditional normalization, economic statecraft, and security engagement. The analysis found that while Arab states possessed complementary capacities, a cohesive, multi-pronged strategy was essential to capitalize on the shifting international consensus. The study concluded by proposing a phased policy roadmap, emphasizing that synchronized action across humanitarian, governance, and security domains was critical for reinforcing sustainable regional stability and enhancing Arab diplomatic leverage. Failure to act cohesively was identified as a significant risk for prolonged instability and diminished Arab influence.
Keywords: Gaza Crisis, Arab Strategy, Post-Conflict Governance, UNGA 2025.

Introduction

The Gaza crisis remains one of the most entrenched conflicts in the Middle East, marked by recurrent cycles of violence, contested governance, and competing regional and international interventions. Historically, Arab responses have oscillated between direct confrontation, as witnessed in the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, and phases of pragmatic accommodation, most notably the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Abraham Accords (2020). The most recent escalation in 2023 exposed the limitations of existing regional frameworks such as the Abraham Accords and the Arab Peace Initiative (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024) while underscoring the fragmented nature of Arab strategies, which range from humanitarian diplomacy and reconstruction to proxy engagements that deepen divisions (Sayigh, 2021; International Crisis Group [ICG], 2023).

The September 2025 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) added a new layer of urgency to the crisis. Dozens of diplomats staged a walkout during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's address in protest of his vow to "finish the job" in Gaza, signalling widening international dissent (Reuters, 2025; The Guardian, 2025). This act of protest was emblematic of a broader shift, as a coalition of Global South nations framed the conflict through the lens of international law and collective accountability, challenging traditional geopolitical divides (Al Jazeera, 2025). This perspective was underscored by Ghana's President, who called for a Hamas-free governance framework for Gaza (Akufo-Addo, 2025). The UNGA adopted the "New York Declaration," which endorsed a Hamas-free governance framework and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. This development has intensified pressure on Arab states to begin to recalibrate their strategies in line with shifting global expectations.

The primary motivation for this study is the critical opportunity presented by the post-UNGA 2025 consensus for Arab states to forge a coherent collective strategy, a necessary

precondition for reinforcing sustainable regional stability. Divergent state positions have historically limited collective Arab leverage, creating diplomatic vacuums exploited by external actors and reducing accountability for violations of international law. For instance, between 2006 and 2020, the United States vetoed at least 15 UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, effectively shielding it from consequential action (UN Digital Library, 2024). However, the outcome of the 2025 UN General Assembly signifies a potential turning point. This shift is evidenced by the fact that 147 of the 193 UN member states had already recognized the State of Palestine prior to the session, and the recent endorsements by key European powers like France, Spain, and Ireland in 2024 have further consolidated this majority, signaling a powerful normative shift in the international community that challenges longstanding impunity (United Nations, 2024; Al Jazeera, 2024).

This study evaluates the strategic options available to Arab states in responding to the Gaza crisis by employing a qualitative methodology grounded in document analysis, policy reviews, public diplomacy materials, expert interviews, and scenario mapping. The selected period, 2020–2025, is analytically significant because it reflects a transformative phase shaped by the post-Abraham Accords landscape and the 2023–2024 Gaza escalation. These developments together reveal how normalization agreements reshaped regional alignments while simultaneously exposing their limitations under renewed conflict. The timeframe also provides a coherent window for assessing how Arab states recalibrated their strategic behaviour in the face of shifting geopolitical pressures, domestic constraints, and emerging security threats. This dual perspective enables the study to capture both continuity and change in Arab decision-making patterns. Ultimately, the goal is to develop a forward-looking, policy-driven framework offering preventive, corrective, and structural recommendations to enhance Arab coherence and influence within the evolving Middle East order.

Literature Review and Historical Precedents

To evaluate the strategic options available to Arab states after the 2025 UNGA session, it is necessary to draw on historical experiences of post-conflict reconstruction, political settlements, and normalization efforts. Four cases—Lebanon, Iraq, Camp David, and the Abraham Accords—offer transferable lessons and early warning signs relevant to Gaza.

Lebanon: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and Militia Politics

Lebanon demonstrates how poorly designed post-war settlements can entrench militia power and weaken state institutions (Khalaf, 2002; El-Husseini, 2012). External patronage and donor-driven reconstruction often bypassed state channels, reinforcing parallel armed networks and undermining state authority (Leenders, 2012; Salloukh, 2019). The key lesson for Gaza is that reconstruction cannot succeed without a legitimate authority controlling the monopoly of force and an inclusive political settlement (International Crisis Group, 2023; Carnegie Middle East Center, 2024).

Iraq: Reconstruction, Fragmentation, and External Competition

The Iraq experience shows the destabilizing effects of rapid aid flows, externally imposed governance models, and fragmented institutions (Dodge, 2013; Herring & Rangwala, 2006). Competing regional powers and unsequenced reforms undermined local ownership, enabling insurgent networks to flourish (Hashim, 2006; Allawi, 2007). Lessons for Gaza include the need for locally grounded political settlements, gradual institution-building, and strong oversight mechanisms (Barakat, 2020; RAND Corporation, 2021). Warning signs include over-reliance on foreign contractors and unrealistic political timelines (Coyne, 2023; Fukuyama, 2004).

Camp David Accords: State-Level Normalisation

The Camp David Accords illustrate how formal peace can deliver security guarantees and strategic benefits when supported by verifiable commitments and strong international mediation (Quandt, 2005; Telhami, 1990). However, peace agreements centred on elite

interests risk domestic backlash if they fail to address broader Palestinian rights and legitimacy concerns (Barnett, 1998; Kurtzer et al., 2021). For Gaza, the lesson is that normalization should be tied to enforceable concessions rather than symbolic gestures.

The Abraham Accords: Normalisation as Leverage

The Abraham Accords highlight both the opportunities and limits of rapid normalization. While participating states secured diplomatic and economic gains, the agreements made little progress on the underlying Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Alkopher & Blanc, 2021; Feldman, 2022). The core lesson is that normalization can serve as leverage only when linked to verifiable political outcomes for Palestinians (Lynch, 2023; Khalidi, 2020). A key warning sign is treating recognition as an end in itself rather than a strategic tool for advancing a durable political solution (Majid, 2024; Chatham House, 2023).

Mapping Current Arab State Positions

This section analyses the positions of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar in the Gaza crisis, highlighting their core interests, constraints, instruments, red lines, recent actions, and short-term objectives.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia balances its regional leadership ambitions with its partnerships with the United States and Gulf allies. Its interests focus on preventing regional spillover and sustaining Arab legitimacy on Palestinian rights, while constraints relate to fiscal prudence and sensitivities around normalisation with Israel. Riyadh relies on diplomacy, conditional financial pledges, and convening power, with red lines centred on rejecting any settlement lacking a credible path to Palestinian statehood. Recent actions include coordinating Gulf diplomacy and promoting Arab-led political alternatives. In the short term, it seeks to consolidate Arab consensus and tie reconstruction support to political conditions (Brookings, 2024; Carnegie Middle East Center, 2023; Reuters, 2025a, 2025b).

Egypt

Egypt plays a central security and humanitarian role due to its control of the Rafah crossing and its longstanding mediation between Israel and Palestinian groups. Its interests include securing the Sinai frontier and maintaining domestic stability, while constraints relate to internal security fragility and public pressure. Cairo employs border management, intelligence mediation, and humanitarian logistics, with red lines against any permanent changes to Gaza's security arrangements. Recent actions reaffirm its border sovereignty and mediation role. Short-term goals include safeguarding the frontier and shaping outcomes that protect Egyptian sovereignty (International Crisis Group, 2023; Al Jazeera, 2022; Reuters, 2024a).

Jordan

Jordan's stance stems from its custodial role in Jerusalem and the demographic sensitivity of its large Palestinian refugee population. Its interests are preventing new refugee inflows, protecting Jerusalem's status quo, and maintaining internal stability, while constraints include fiscal pressures and heightened political sensitivity. Its tools include diplomatic advocacy, humanitarian coordination, and donor engagement. Red lines involve threats to Jerusalem's status or destabilising population movements. Recent actions include warnings on humanitarian consequences and deeper engagement with UNRWA. Short-term priorities focus on preventing displacement and securing humanitarian support (Congressional Research Service, 2025; Chatham House, 2024; Reuters, 2024b).

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The UAE employs pragmatic diplomacy and economic statecraft aimed at reconstruction and long-term stability. Its interests include shaping a coherent governance framework for post-war Gaza, while constraints relate to reputational risks and alignment with Western partners. Its instruments include reconstruction pledges, investment

partnerships, and humanitarian soft power. Red lines involve engaging in reconstruction without political legitimacy or security guarantees. Recent actions signal selective and conditional reconstruction engagement. Short-term objectives include positioning itself as a central reconstruction actor while retaining diplomatic flexibility (Atlantic Council, 2024; Reuters, 2025c, 2025d).

Qatar

Qatar leverages its mediator role and sustained humanitarian presence to maintain influence in Gaza. Its interests involve stabilisation, diplomatic relevance, and managing relationships with various Palestinian factions. Constraints include rival Gulf pressures and donor fatigue. Its instruments include humanitarian transfers, ceasefire mediation, and informal channels of communication. Red lines include being sidelined from mediation or delegitimised for engaging with Palestinian groups. Recent actions involve shuttle diplomacy and strategic pauses in mediation. Short-term priorities include preserving its mediator role and ensuring continued humanitarian flows (Carnegie Endowment, 2024; Reuters, 2024c, 2025e).

The Post-UNGA 2025 Imperative for Arab States

The adoption of the "New York Declaration" at the September 2025 UNGA session presents a new strategic calculus for Arab states, compelling a reassessment of their diplomatic approach to Gaza. These are discussed subsequently.

a. *Cohesive Diplomatic Statecraft*. This pathway involves a unified Arab diplomatic front aimed at cementing the gains of the UNGA resolution. The objective is to translate the "New York Declaration" into a concrete, internationally backed roadmap. This would include actively lobbying key Global South and European nations to isolate detractors and building a legal case at international bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to frame the blockade and reconstruction of Gaza within the frameworks of international humanitarian law (ICJ, 2024). The intended outcome is to position the Arab League as the primary architect of a legitimate political process, thereby marginalizing both Hamas's militancy and Israel's unilateralism (Barnett, 2020). Success hinges on presenting a coherent alternative that garners broader global support than the US-Israeli stance.
b. *Stewardship of Transitional Governance*. Arab states, potentially in partnership with a reformed Palestinian Authority and under a UN umbrella, could take a leading role in establishing an interim administrative body for Gaza. The central aim is to prevent a governance vacuum that could be exploited by extremist elements, thereby ensuring stability and channeling aid effectively (Sayigh, 2021). This approach allows Arab states to directly shape institutional reforms, vet security personnel, and ensure that the new governance structure is both technocratically competent and politically acceptable to the Palestinian populace, aligning long-term outcomes with Arab regional security interests.
c. *Conditional Normalization as Collective Leverage*. The new context allows Arab states to reframe normalization not as a bilateral reward but as a collective incentive. The pathway involves formally linking the continuation or expansion of the Abraham Accords to Israeli adherence to the UNGA-endorsed framework, including a verifiable ceasefire and participation in the transitional governance structure (Miller, 2022). The strategic goal is to create a unified Arab position that uses diplomatic and economic relations as a carrot-and-stick mechanism, compelling tangible Israeli concessions on Palestinian statehood that were absent from earlier normalization agreements.
d. *Strategic Reconstruction and Economic Statecraft*. Arab states, through sovereign wealth funds and development banks, can lead a coordinated reconstruction effort with strict conditionality. The objective is to rebuild Gaza while ensuring that resources are not diverted to militant groups. This can be achieved by tying financial aid to the presence of

the new transitional authority and international oversight mechanisms (Hanieh, 2018). By controlling the purse strings, Arab states can guarantee that reconstruction fosters stability and aligns with their vision for a demilitarized, economically viable Gaza, effectively using economic power to achieve political ends.

e. *Coordinated Security Engagement*. While high-risk, a coordinated approach to security could involve supporting vetted Palestinian security forces under the transitional authority to maintain order and prevent the re-emergence of armed factions. The strategic objective is to ensure that the security apparatus in Gaza is accountable to a legitimate political body rather than militant groups, thereby consolidating the gains of the political process (Byman, 2019). This pathway requires extreme caution to avoid the perception of collusion with Israel, but if managed transparently, it could be critical for sustainable stability

Assessing Strategic Feasibility

This section evaluates the feasibility of the proposed strategic pathways using consistent criteria-political will, resource capacity, domestic legitimacy, international legal constraints, operational access, escalation risk, and time horizon-to determine whether each option is feasible, conditionally feasible, or infeasible for Arab states.

a. *Diplomatic Engagement.* Diplomacy and mediation are broadly feasible for most Arab states due to low resource costs and high diplomatic returns. Saudi Arabia can leverage this pathway to bolster its regional leadership image, though it must navigate domestic sensitivities regarding normalization (Barnett, 2020). Egypt remains a credible mediator given its historical role, yet domestic economic challenges limit its leverage (Brown, 2021). Qatar's established mediation record makes this highly feasible, while the UAE and Jordan also retain feasible—though more cautious—capacity, with Jordan's refugee burden tempering its engagement level (Yom, 2016).

b. *Transitional Governance*. Transitional governance is conditionally feasible, requiring high legitimacy, sustained resources, and international coordination. Egypt's border access offers operational feasibility, but domestic instability questions its long-term role. Saudi and UAE involvement is conditional on enhancing their regional stature without assuming direct political responsibility (Sayigh, 2021). Qatar's local ties offer some feasibility, though its involvement may provoke intra-Arab tensions. Jordan lacks the resources and political bandwidth for significant input.

c. *Normalization as Leverage.* This pathway is only feasible for states with established or potential ties to Israel. The UAE can effectively use its Abraham Accords standing to seek concessions (Miller, 2022). Saudi feasibility is conditional on securing visible progress toward Palestinian statehood to offset domestic and religious risks. Egypt and Jordan possess limited leverage due to pre-existing treaties, while Qatar's non-normalization stance renders this option infeasible.

d. *Reconstruction and Economic Statecraft*. Reconstruction is highly feasible for resource-rich Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE can lead financing but will attach strict political and security conditions (Hanieh, 2018). Qatar is also feasible given its reconstruction experience, though it risks friction with neighbors. Egypt's role is conditional, leveraging border control despite fiscal limits, while Jordan's economic fragility makes it largely infeasible.

e. *Proxy and Covert Channels*. Proxy support is the least feasible and highest-risk pathway. Qatar retains conditional feasibility through its Palestinian networks but faces major reputational costs (Byman, 2019). Saudi and UAE involvement is limited to deniable scenarios. Egypt and Jordan find this route infeasible due to reliance on U.S. support and domestic stability concerns..

External constraints and enablers

This section assesses the external constraints and enablers that shape Arab strategic choices in the Gaza crisis.

a. **United States: security guarantees, funding, diplomatic pull/push.** The United States remains the most influential external actor, offering security guarantees to regional allies and wielding significant diplomatic leverage over ceasefire negotiations and reconstruction frameworks. Its role as a primary defence partner for states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia positions Washington as both an enabler and a constraint, depending on the alignment of Arab strategies with US policy priorities. Financial assistance and military aid create opportunities for Arab states to anchor their strategies, yet conditionalities tied to US domestic politics and alliance commitments limit independent manoeuvre (Miller, 2023).

b. **Iran: proxy networks, regional influence, deterrent posture**. Iran exerts influence through its well-developed network of regional proxies, particularly in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Gaza. Its deterrent posture and asymmetric strategies provide leverage against both Arab states and Israel, complicating Arab diplomatic initiatives and reconstruction efforts (Ehteshami & Varvelli, 2021). While Iranian support to armed groups acts as a constraint by heightening escalation risks, it also indirectly shapes Arab strategies by compelling some states to deepen security coordination with external powers.

c. **European Union: reconstruction funding, legal norms, mediation capacity**. The European Union functions primarily as a financial and normative actor, providing humanitarian assistance, reconstruction funding, and institutional support for governance reforms. Its emphasis on human rights, international law, and multilateral frameworks introduces conditionalities that may constrain Arab flexibility but also offers opportunities for leveraging legitimacy and international partnerships (Tocci, 2022). The EU's mediation capacity is limited by its internal divisions and reliance on US security leadership, yet it remains a critical enabler for post-conflict recovery programmes.

d. **United Nations and international financial institutions: legitimacy, coordination platforms, conditionality.** The United Nations and international financial institutions (IFIs) provide platforms for coordination, legitimacy, and resource mobilisation. The UN plays a pivotal role in humanitarian access and monitoring compliance with international legal frameworks, while IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF offer financial tools for reconstruction tied to governance and fiscal reforms (Weiss, 2018). These actors enable Arab strategies by facilitating multilateral engagement and funding but constrain them through conditionality requirements and bureaucratic processes that often slow implementation.

Scenario projection and impact analysis

This section projects three plausible Gaza trajectories and assesses triggers, actor strategies, event sequences, winners and losers, regional-order impacts, monitoring metrics, probability estimates, principal risks, and early warning indicators.

Scenario A: Managed diplomatic settlement with phased reconstruction

A managed diplomatic settlement with phased reconstruction—estimated at a 40% probability—would emerge from a durable ceasefire linked to an internationally endorsed political roadmap. Under this scenario, Arab states provide conditional funding and political guarantees, while the US and EU coordinate diplomacy and security assurances. Qatar and Egypt would lead mediation and aid delivery, with Israel accepting limited phased governance tied to security arrangements. The sequence involves sustaining the ceasefire, opening humanitarian corridors, and establishing a multilateral reconstruction fund with strict oversight. Reconstruction would proceed in stages, enabling gradual restoration of governance capacity. Likely beneficiaries include Gulf donors, reconstruction actors, and

moderate Palestinian institutions, while spoilers dependent on patronage networks lose influence. Key monitoring indicators include ceasefire stability, reconstruction disbursements, civilian casualty trends, displacement returns, and militant activity, although risks such as donor fragmentation and elite capture remain significant (Sayigh, 2021; Tocci, 2022).

Scenario B: Frozen Conflict with Localised Governance and Donor Fatigue (Reduced)

A prolonged stalemate—probability 35%—would result from recurring short-term ceasefires that fail to produce a political settlement and declining international commitment to reconstruction. External actors adopt risk-averse strategies, Arab states limit involvement to humanitarian relief, and local authorities consolidate power in fragmented enclaves. Humanitarian aid continues at minimal levels, but governance deteriorates as informal economies and local strongmen expand influence. The winners become local power brokers and smuggling networks, while civilians and prospects for state legitimacy suffer. Regionally, normalized instability fuels cross-border insecurity, irregular migration, and declining investor confidence. Key indicators include donor disbursements, local violent incidents, governance capacity metrics, and refugee flows (Weiss, 2018). Major risks involve worsening humanitarian crises, radicalization, and embedded parallel governance structures (Dodge, 2013).

Scenario C: Escalation and Regionalisation with Proxy Intensification (Reduced)

With a probability of 25%, escalation would be triggered by battlefield shocks, targeted assassinations, or external military incidents that unravel containment dynamics. Regional powers respond by increasing overt and covert support to proxies, deepening Iran–US rivalry and dividing Arab states between de-escalation and security hardening. The conflict spreads beyond Gaza into Lebanon, Sinai, and the Levant, overwhelming diplomatic efforts and elevating military confrontation. External patrons gain strategic leverage, while civilians, regional stability, and economic systems absorb the greatest losses. This trajectory accelerates security competition, weakens multilateral governance, and risks broader regional realignment. Monitoring should track cross-border attacks, external arms transfers, refugee flows, and disruptions to regional trade (Byman, 2019). Early warning signs include spikes in external military supplies, proxy mobilization campaigns, and strikes on critical infrastructure.

Cross-scenario monitoring framework and policy implications

Developing a cross-scenario monitoring framework is critical for enabling timely and adaptive policy responses in a volatile and fast-changing conflict environment. While Scenarios A, B, and C outline distinct pathways with different probabilities and consequences, they share overlapping dynamics that require a common set of indicators. Adopting a concise group of shared indicators ensures that policymakers can assess developments consistently, compare trajectories across scenarios, and anticipate potential inflection points (George & Bennett, 2005).

The core indicators for monitoring include ceasefire durability, which provides the most immediate measure of conflict de-escalation and stability. Reconstruction finance transparency is equally important, as donor credibility and public legitimacy depend on the efficient and accountable management of funds (Sayigh, 2021). Humanitarian access metrics, such as the number of aid convoys admitted and the timeliness of service delivery, serve as early signals of whether humanitarian needs are being addressed or neglected. The frequency of militant attacks provides a proxy for both the strength of spoilers and the resilience of ceasefire arrangements (Byman, 2019). Refugee and displacement flows offer insight into the societal toll of the conflict and the burden placed on neighbouring states. Finally, donor commitment levels—both financial and political—indicate whether the international community is sustaining engagement or drifting toward fatigue (Weiss, 2018).

Given the fluidity of regional and global politics, scenario probabilities should not be treated as static. Instead, they must be revisited on a quarterly basis, informed by new intelligence assessments, evolving diplomatic initiatives, and observed developments on the ground. This adaptive approach ensures that policymakers do not anchor on outdated assumptions but instead recalibrate strategies to reflect emerging realities (Tocci, 2022). From a policy perspective, the most urgent task is to expand the probability space for the managed settlement scenario, which offers the most constructive path towards stabilisation and reconstruction. This requires sustained investment in mediation, careful conditionality in reconstruction financing, and multilateral coordination to strengthen Palestinian governance structures. At the same time, it is essential to reduce the structural drivers that reinforce the frozen conflict scenario, such as fragmented donor coordination, weak local institutions, and humanitarian neglect. Likewise, mitigating the escalation pathway demands proactive steps to constrain arms transfers, reduce proxy patronage, and strengthen early warning mechanisms to prevent battlefield shocks from cascading into regional conflagration (Dodge, 2013).

Ultimately, the policy implications are twofold. First, Arab states and international actors must align their efforts toward promoting a rules-based and transparent reconstruction process, which can build legitimacy and reduce grievances that fuel instability. Second, policymakers should prioritise preventive diplomacy and coordinated monitoring mechanisms that integrate intelligence, humanitarian reporting, and financial oversight. By embedding such practices into their strategic outlook, decision-makers can create greater resilience against negative trajectories and promote a more sustainable regional order.

Policy options and recommendations

Policy options and recommendations are organised by timeframe and prioritised by feasibility and strategic payoff. Each proposal assigns practical roles to key Arab states and regional bodies to ensure coordinated implementation and measurable impact.

Immediate measures high feasibility, high payoff. Establish protected humanitarian corridors and fast-track mediation frameworks to stabilise the environment and create space for reconstruction planning. Egypt should lead logistics and border management for humanitarian access, given its geographic role and operational capacity. Qatar should lead mediation channels and shuttle diplomacy to keep parties engaged. Saudi Arabia and the UAE should commit rapid but transparent donor pledges conditioned on oversight. Jordan should provide temporary hosting capacity and diplomatic support for refugee and protection needs. The African Union, the League of Arab States and the UN should provide political legitimacy and monitoring. Third-party guarantors such as the EU or major bilateral partners should underwrite corridor security and verification mechanisms.

Medium-term measures — moderate feasibility, medium to high payoff. Create conditional finance instruments that link reconstruction disbursements to clear governance and protection benchmarks. The UAE and Saudi Arabia should co-chair a donor coordination mechanism that uses transparent fiduciary controls and independent audit panels. Egypt and Qatar should support capacity building for local governance and municipal services while Jordan and international financial institutions fund livelihood and employment programmes. Implement security sector reform programmes that prioritise vetting, human rights compliance, and integration of local security providers into accountable structures. The AU and League of Arab States should help harmonise benchmarks and verify compliance through joint technical teams.

Structural measures — lower feasibility, high long-term payoff. Establish a multilateral reconstruction trust fund governed by a consortium of regional and international stakeholders to ensure pooled financing, impartial oversight and protection against elite capture. Reform regional architectures to institutionalise rapid response, mediation, and reconstruction coordination, using the AU, League of Arab States and a designated Lead

Coordinator to synchronise political, security and development tracks. Introduce confidence building measures such as phased demilitarised zones, joint civil service exchanges, and shared infrastructure projects that bind local actors to cooperative outcomes. Promote normative instruments to constrain proxy arming and clandestine transfers, supported by an independent monitoring mechanism with reporting obligations.

Role allocation and coordination. Saudi Arabia and the UAE should function primarily as principal financiers and political backers of reconstruction. Egypt should serve as the operational hub for mediation, humanitarian logistics and security guarantees along shared borders. Qatar should retain a specialised mediation and humanitarian channel role. Jordan should focus on humanitarian hosting, refugee protection and regional diplomacy. The League of Arab States and the African Union should coordinate political messaging, standardise governance benchmarks and institutionalise regional monitoring. The UN, World Bank and major bilateral partners should act as technical partners, third-party guarantors and trustees for financial transparency.

Conclusion

The study finds that durable stabilisation depends on synchronising humanitarian relief, conditional reconstruction finance, governance rebuilding, and credible security reform. Arab states possess complementary capacities that, if coordinated, can increase the probability of a managed settlement and limit the appeal of frozen conflict or regional escalation. Transparent multilateral finance mechanisms and rigorous monitoring are essential to prevent elite capture and to sustain donor confidence. Failure to act cohesively risks long term regional instability, greater proxy competition, and erosion of Arab diplomatic leverage. The recommended roadmap offers a pragmatic sequence of interventions that balance immediacy with structural reform and create measurable pathways for regional influence through constructive statecraft.

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