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CONVERGENCE OF TERRORISM AND TRANS -NATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT
Nigeria is inundated with security challenges that seemingly overstretch security managers. Some of these insecurity issues are the criminal activities of trans-criminals and terrorists. They are complex and carried out via shadow and concealed networks. The influx of transnational criminals has risen higher. Human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, and illicit and counterfeit goods are highly prohibited as it makes the nation vulnerable. The festering and bolstering of terrorism experienced in Northern Nigeria feeds on the fecundity of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The routes and swathes the transnational organized criminals use are the same as the ones the terrorists (Boko Haram, Violent Pastoralists, and Bandits) use, so they are intertwined. With their ongoing changes in operations, security management in Nigeria faces the task of ensuring result-oriented security governance (policy formulation and implementation) to tackle security breaches related to transnational crime and terrorism. Security governance emphasizes multi-level governance with multiple but coordinated operators in the security operations ecosystem. In what remains a huge problem, trans national crime and terrorism thrive and are incentivized by: Economic Community of West African States' Protocol on Free movement, Border communities' affinity, official corruption, porous borders, state-centric security operations, etc. The study used secondary data; therefore, content analysis was adopted. The Operationalizing Security Governance Treatise/Multi-Level Governance were applied to the study as the theory. It is recommended that a multi-sectoral or level security governance be the primary referent of counter-transnational organized crime and terrorism. This will ensure the deepening and widening of security operations with the desired outcome. The study concludes that multi-stakeholder engagement remains a potent mechanism in security governance.

KEYWORDS: Security, Governance, Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crime

INTRODUCTION
The growing intra-state insecurity is threatening the stability of many nations in the world. Since the end of the Cold War, observers have drawn attention to the rise of the "world risk society" (Beck, 1999). This concept challenges the state-centric notion of security and builds upon the argument that the end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the likelihood of interstate war, whereas threats from civil wars, transnational crime, terrorism, and infectious

diseases appear to have increased (United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS(UNAIDS), 2000).

Security risks are becoming increasingly transnational, while the material and ideational resources necessary to enable and legitimize effective responses largely continue to reside with nation-states. As a consequence, states remain pivotal actors; however, their ability to ensure the provision of security unilaterally is increasingly limited. States, therefore, must coordinate their efforts with a wider range of actors using more diverse modes of coordination. Scholars have described these changes as "governance without government" (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992) or "governance beyond the nation-state" (Zürn, 1998). This trend coincides with the emergence of new conceptions of security and the deepening and widening of security in terms of potential reference objects and threats (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). The resulting variety of actors, mechanisms, and issues extends well beyond traditional, state-centered, and military-focused security policy. This development brings to the fore a paradigm shift in security architecture that complements traditional models of security relations such as alliances, security regimes, and security communities. It reflects the establishment of policies shaped by security networks comprising multilateral actors from both state and non-state structures. The changing operational pattern creates a shift from "government" to "governance."

TOC and terrorism are two phenomena that define security issues of the twenty-first century for policymakers, just as the Cold War defined the twentieth century and colonialism defined the nineteenth. Terrorist and transnational criminal groups are likely to proliferate because they are major beneficiaries of globalization. They take advantage of increased travel and trade, rapid financial flows, telecommunications, and computer networks, and are therefore well-positioned for growth. The International Peace Institute (IPI) Blue Paper (2009) states that in some parts of the world, these groups may even threaten the effective functioning of states, as seen in West Africa and parts of Afghanistan, with enormous potential spillover costs for other states. TOC amplifies and transmits other security challenges, such as armed conflict, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and even disease, while undermining the capacity of states, societies, and the international system to respond.

The character of TOC can mutate into and fuse with full-blown terrorism. These networks pose significant threats and challenge to national security. TOC organizations have diversified their activities, taking advantage of open borders, rapid increases in the volume and speed of global trade, and the dissemination of technological tools. Criminal organizations that once dealt almost exclusively in narcotics now engage in trafficking small arms and light weapons, human beings, counterfeit goods, and illicit financial flows, as well as perpetrating large-scale violence against local populations. Criminal organizations and terrorist groups are often affiliated to the extent that their identities sometimes become blurred and difficult to distinguish. The Global Regime for Transnational Crime (n.d.) notes that criminal groups have appropriated new technologies, adopted horizontal network structures that are difficult to trace and dismantle, and diversified their activities. The result has been an unprecedented scale of international crime.

Northern Nigeria, particularly bordered by Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, has experienced significant cross-border infiltration, with extensive illicit transactions along these borders. Several factors facilitate these activities, including porous borders, strong cross-border community affinities, official corruption, the persistence of religious fundamentalism, financial incentives, and governance deficits. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2025), Nigeria's terrorism score increased from 7.58 in 2024 to 7.66 in 2025. Nigeria ranks

next to Niger, whose score rose from 7.27 in 2024 to 7.78 in 2025. The Niger–Nigeria border has become a focal point for TOC and terrorist activities.

Combating TOC and terrorism should not rely solely on theatrical military operations; alternative non-combat approaches should also be deployed, engaging actors beyond the military sphere. However, such actors must be properly vetted and their integrity ensured. CARE (2001) argues that the continued incapacitation of traditional security structures suggests the need to diversify operations to include non-state actors who can operate in areas where state actors may have shortcomings. Jessop (1999) states that while relations among diverse security actors have traditionally been conceived in terms of alliances or communities, the fragmented yet overlapping networks that structure collaboration among an expanding range of public and private security actors are more accurately described by the concept of governance.

At the same time that governments and international organizations have expanded their security functions, limited resources, lack of expertise in non-traditional security areas, and divergent interests among governments in Europe and North America have contributed to the increasing fragmentation of authority in security policymaking. In addition to national governments and international organizations, a variety of private actors, ranging from charities to private security companies, have emerged in local, regional, and global security arenas. These actors address issues such as humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring refugee assistance and military training and protection (Amnesty International, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002, MPRI, 2002).

The costs of outdated approaches to combating TOC are becoming increasingly evident in regions as diverse as Africa and Afghanistan. A fresh and comprehensive strategy is required to ensure that TOC does not become an unstoppable source of funding and supply for pirates, terrorists, corrupt politicians, warlords, and rogue governments worldwide (International Peace Institute IPI Blue Paper, 2009). However, understanding terrorists and transnational organized criminals' operations, source of funding, sanctuaries and swatches reduces their activities and increases their vulnerability.

Conceptual Discourse

Trans-National Organized Crime

Strategy to Combating Tran-National Organized Crime (2011) states that:

> 'Trans-National Organized Crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.

There is no single structure under which transnational organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may evolve to other structures. The crimes they commit also vary. Transnational organized criminals act conspiratorially in their criminal activities and possess certain characteristics which may include, but are not limited to:

i. As part of their activities, they commit violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate, or make actual or implicit threats to do so;

ii. They exploit differences between countries to further their objectives, enriching their organization, expanding its power, and/or avoiding detection/apprehension;
iii. They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means;
iv. They have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from patently illegal activities but also from investment in legitimate businesses; and
v. They attempt to insulate both their leadership and membership from detection, sanction, and/or prosecution through their organizational structure.

Stopped

Voronin (2000) opines that the main kinds of transnational organized crime activity consist the following illicit businesses: illegal migration, trafficking in women and children, trafficking in body parts, corruption, theft and illegal export of cultural property, theft and trafficking in automobiles, fauna and flora trafficking, computer crimes, software piracy, nuclear material theft and trafficking, trafficking in firearms, trafficking in drugs, money laundering. No doubt, there can be identified other organized crime activities which have a transnational character or transnational implications. But in any case, if there is some uncertainty about the categorization of particular organized criminal activities in the mentioned range, however, their most common and distinctive feature is that it involves the crossing of borders or national jurisdictions.

Transnational criminal activity has increased in scale and extent, becoming a complex worldwide threat. Transnational criminals ignore borders; they move sums of money through the international financial system that are so huge they dwarf the combined economies of many nations. They are often organized in multi-crime businesses, and they have capitalized on growth in international communications and transportation to expand their criminal operations and form potent alliances. The corrosive activities of transnational criminal groups in the post-Cold War era no longer threaten particular countries or regions. They threaten all nations. Transnational organized crime is not only a law enforcement problem, as it is a formidable force and widely spread, it increases threat to national and international security. It requires all stakeholders to combat it.

Security Governance

Krahmann (2003) states that different scholars have focused on the different processes of decision-making and implementation of security policies, which are characterized by fragmented power and authority within and outside the state. Postulations on Security governance is divided in two main branches: one dealing with governmental actors (states and international organizations) and one dealing with non-state actors, with little interaction among the two. Therefore, if a branch of literature looks at the interaction among governmental actors at the regional and global level (Van Langhenhove, Lucarelli & Wouters 2012), another wide branch of literature looks at the role of private actors such as security agencies and private military firms (Bigo, 2006; Leander, 2006; Watson, 2009). This understanding of security governance looks particularly at actors and levels and little to what these actors share.

That the security landscape is characterized by a growing range of different actors is widely recognized. Indeed, governance as a term has been especially referred not only to the variegated levels of coordination: regional (Breslin & Croft 2012; Paul, 2012), inter-regional (Lucarelli, Pinfari & Santini, 2014) and global (Gowan, 2008; Britz, Ojanen, 2009) but incorporating other strata and non-governmental actors. Increasingly growing, is also the literature acknowledging the role of non-state actors in security dynamics either as agent of

security threats (for example terrorists and nets of organized crime), referents (society, human beings) or as parts of the process of security management: thus, for example, security agencies and private actors have been under the spotlight of many security analyses (Bigo, 2006; Leander, 2006; Watson, 2009). NGO's have been particularly studied as far as their implementation in security coordination was concerned (Westermeyer, 2013; Ryerson, 2012; Richmond & Carey 2005; Carey, 2012).

To Webber et al. (2004), security governance denotes the:

> coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes (p. 8).

(Krahmann (2003) opines that security governance as 'the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority' (p. 11). Security governances attempt to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the state to societies and individuals, and from military to non-military issues. Security governance allows for wider and greater involvement of numerous mechanisms and circle of actors included for consideration in security discussions in a multi-lateral security environment.

The significance of informal coordination and private actors in security governance in which governmental actors and de facto hierarchies are not dominant, but may still play a role, cannot be dampened. Krahmann (2003) says Security theory allows for spheres of domestic security including governments and non-government actors to be considered in conjunction with the international sphere and its linkages with NGOs, international institutions, epistemic communities, and others.

Terrorism

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

The US Department of Defence has defined terrorism as:

> 'The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or society in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.'

Mockaitis (2007) observes that the problem with the Department of Defence definition is that it covers all sorts of terrorist activities, it does not discern it clearly enough from other forms of violence. Simultaneously, nine other US government departments have come forward with nine other definitions (p. 2)

The European Union sees as terrorism acts those that aim at:

1. seriously intimidating a population;
2. unduly compelling a government or international organisation to
3. perform or abstain from performing any act;
4. seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional,
5. economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (Council Framework Decision, 2002).

These objectives can be achieved through various illegal activities. They range from attacks on a person's life to cutting vital services to society, and respective threats; they include hijackings, kidnappings and other forms of criminal activity. According to the EU definition, terrorism is not a particular ideology or movement, but rather a method or tactic for achieving various goals(EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report, 2007).

Theoretical Framework

Multi-Level Governance: Multi-level (or multilevel) governance is a term used to describe the way power is spread vertically between levels of government and horizontally across multiple quasi-government and non-governmental organizations and actors. This situation develops because countries have multiple levels of government including local, regional, state, national or federal, and many other organisations with interests in policy decisions and outcomes. International governance operates based on multi-level governance principles. Multi-level governance can be distinguished from multi-level government which is when different levels of government share or transfer responsibility amongst each other. Whereas multi-level governance analyses the relationship of different state levels and interaction with different types of actors.'

The literature includes dynamics of security policy development and sketches relationships between different actors and forums. In a world where the concept of human security and universal norms were growing in acceptance, security governance emerged as a sort of 'common purpose' or a 'normative consensus' to which a universal good could appeal (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). From the inside, whereas security policy was the work and responsibility of governments, security governance is often used to point at the shortcomings of the nation-state, at frail, fragile, or failing states which require other sources of authority - usually outside itself - in order to maintain security, and at transnational risks too large for the state alone. Thus it remains flexible enough to allow for both governance without government but also governance by governments in overlapping contexts (Zuern, 1998)

Multi-level governance gives expression to the idea that there are many interacting authority structures at work in the emergent global political economy. It "illuminates the intimate entanglement between the domestic and international levels of authority".

An early explanation referred to multi-level governance as a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers[1] and described how supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks. The theory emphasized both the increasingly frequent and complex interactions between governmental actors and the increasingly important dimension of non-state actors that are mobilized in cohesion policy-making and in the EU policy more generally. As such, multi-level governance raised new and important questions about the role, power and authority of states. The actor in multi-level governance are:

i. Government Agencies
ii. Civil Society Organizations (NGOs, Community groups).

iii. Private Sector entities.

Employing traditional and non-traditional military remains portend. This presuppose the building of a system of deployment of the "Blue suits" of civilian make up and not only military "blue helmets," to build the long-term security that protects societies against organized crime and conflict.

Security Governance takes the structure of multi-level governance. Vertical as it relates to hierarchical legislative power of Local, State and Federal Governments and the three arms of government (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary). Horizontally, this includes civil society/Non-Governmental Organization) and Private Security. Flemes & Radseck (2012) observe that Multi-level interaction not only does it illustrate that the challenges of diverse actor goals and mobilisation interact with operational coordination and issues-development frameworks, it also attempts to place these interactions in a multi-level structure where issues interactions take place on multiple levels with a plethora of actors simultaneously along with the potential for overlap (p.6). In this case, they include both inter-governmental and inter-entity interactions and relationships where municipal authorities have the potential to engage with supranational or IO for direct coordination on specific topics (Peters & Pierre, 2002).

Elsewhere, these forces have been described as the 'open method of coordination' where research and innovation for policies can be conducted through 'an informal organisational framework for mutual policy learning' (Boerzel & Risse, 2001; Kaiser & Prange, 2004) or as a form of policy transfer (Radaelli, 2000).

Pertinent questions arise in the Multi-level government:

i. whether and in what manner multiple levels of government are simultaneously involved in security policy development;
ii. to what extent non-governmental actors both civil and private are included at different governmental levels and whether their contributions are given greater weight at one level or another; and,
iii. whether these processes noticeably impact the outcomes (Piattoni, 2010, pp. 83-85).

Drivers of Trans National Organized Crime and Terrorism

Failed State and Weak Government

Voronin (2000) states that the TOC and terrorists act as parasites, for example, in cases where there are weak governments which have neither the resources nor political power to oppose them. They prosper on the fantastic amounts of money which they get as a result of illegal activity, particulary the production and sale of drugs. They are able to benefit from the increasing migration of people through countries and continents. Modern sophisticated weapons and appropriate technologies, which they have at their disposal, are effective means for the realization and protection of interests of transnational criminal groups.

The inability of many states and international organizations to design and coordinate effective anti-criminal programs creates a favorable climate for the criminal community to maneuver in their resistance to law enforcement organs. So it is extremely important to develop the appropriate countermeasures to transnational organized criminal activity.

Rotherg (2004) provides detailed and graphic descriptions of state failure and its consequences. It is expressed in civil unrest undermining the potency and efficacy of institution and legal framework. Rotherg's description of the failed state is "a polity that is no

longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world" and his notion that "failure is a fluid halting place. There is no visible departure from this reality from the posture of the state, in terms of responses and reactions.

The most central and perhaps the most important political good that needs and must be delivered by every state is the provision of security. What this translates to is that the citizens depend on the state for security. Rotberg (2002) comments that failed states are deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factions, the state faces multi-faceted civil unrest, differing degrees of communal discontent, massive deterioration in the standard of living, decay in infrastructure and the greed leaders overwhelms their socio-political responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings; forcing the people to turn to their ethnic affiliations for safety and protection.

i. Ecowas Free Movement Protocol

Economic Community of West African States Protocol on Free Movement of People, Goods and Services was established by the ECOWAS Member States in 1979. The main aim of this Protocol is to facilitate the free movement of people, goods and services within the West Africa without Visa; this simply means that any ECOWAS citizen who poses valid travelling document and International Health Certificate can transverse the entire region without a visa. Thereby, compelling all member states to abolish the use of visa in order to ease the movement of people in the region. However, in spite of the positive pronouncement of this protocol, it has its own negative effects. It gives unfettered access to all kinds of persons with little or no restriction and checks.

Nigerian policy makers appear not to have anticipated the large flow of trans-border migration that was likely to occur as well as the national security implications of such a flow once the country signed and ratified the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People in 1979. Within three years, there was a wave of migrants from ECOWAS member states, many of whom did not obtain ECOWAS travel documents or arrive through official designated points of entry. Consequently, thousands of migrants, including a large wave of migrants from Niger and Chad (Boutwell & Klare, 1999).

ii. Bonded affinity of Border Communities

Border communities in Nigeria have close affinity with the Neighboring nations' communities. It becomes difficult to separate them. They relate in commerce, cultural orientation, inter-marriages and habitation. The areas have strong context of bi-national and bicultural attributes. These border residents see themselves as being part of the border with the two identities coexisting. For instance Nigeria border and Niger the culture of Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger at the border, exhibit a high degree of communality that includes language, traditions, food, music, folklore, and even architecture. It is a complex setting that infiltration can hardly succeed.

The issue of illegal flows across the northeastern borders is further exacerbated by the strong and deep-rooted family ties that exist. For instance, between the Kanuri in Borno and those in Chad and Niger, family ties are so strong that many of the royal and noble families on either side are related by blood and marriage. Similarly, some parts of southern Niger are still under the traditional authority of the Shehu of Borno in Nigeria, with Maiduguri serving as a commercial and cultural hub for many Kanuri on both sides of the border.

iii. Lack of clear demarcation of Nigerian border

The Nigerian –Chadian and Camerounian border pose a great challenge to the Stability of Northern Nigeria. Imobighe (2003) opines that the ineffective demarcation of Nigeria's

border has been a big challenge to her national security. While the Western and Northern borders are fairly well demarcated and perhaps need only minor adjustments and up-dating, some parts of the eastern and north-eastern borders with Cameroun and Chad respectively have not been effectively demarcated and have remained bones of contention between Nigeria and the two neighbouring countries (p.35).

iv. Elusiveness of TOCs and Terrorists

According to Voronin (2000). Transnational organized crime possesses a powerful potential and is highly dynamical. Therefore, it possesses a serious danger to the existence of both single states and the world community as a whole. Transnational criminal groups are very well organized and equipped. It is extremely difficult for law enforcement organs to find their way into the organizational structures of these groups, because many of them are based on ethnicity and act in the spheres of jurisdiction of different states. Transnational criminal groups use violence and bribery. Their activity undermines the authority of legal power and weakens democratic institutions. They destroy financial markets and economies of many states. The governmental resources that are designed to solve many social and economic problems are not enough to

offset the criminal organizations at all. Many of them consolidate their connections with militant, ethnic, and religious movements.

v. Unchecked Alliances and Conspiracy of some Local and Foreign Fulani Militia

The continues depredation of villages in the North West and North Central by 'Foreign Fulani Militia'(Bandits, Lakurawa, Wulo Wulo, Mamuda) without affecting the indigenous pastoralists shows the ongoing and existential conspiracy and alliances between some Local and Foreign Pastoralists. This activity has opened up a vista for land grabbing. While natives are killed and survivors evacuating/fleeing, the 'indigenous herders' remain and new entrants occupy vacated spaces. This act of terrorism has remained unabated as the alliance and conspiracy fester.

vi. Lack of Prosecution of TOCs and Terrorists

Terrorists caught during cross fire by our gallant Army and cases of those culpable of heinous crimes end up at the police level where assailant are set free on a perpetual bail and never prosecuted. The terrorists are granted amnesty and subsequent spurious rehabilitation. By implication deterrence is jettisoned.

The recent release of terrorist financiers linked to some persons and Bureau de Change in Nigeria has neither been made public nor have the suspects tried.

According to SEEDS (2018) the Nigerian state must appreciate the enormous danger associated with the rampant manner in which offenders are easily left the hook after arrest. It is indeed a very sad commentary on our law enforcement system that a criminal who even owns up to committing heinous crimes returns to the community shortly after arrest. These offenders brag around their communities daring anyone to report them to law enforcement agencies. Justice is a three-way traffic (justice for the aggrieved, justice for the accused and justice for the community). A strong justice system that is capable of protecting the rights of all and sundry is needed.

vii. Apologists and Sympathizers' Syndrome

In any society where criminals have apologists and sympathizers in low and high places, crime perpetuates. The engagement of interest parties in counter insurgency and terrorism remains a one of the critical albatrosses in the theater of war in Nigeria. The outcome will not be short of the backlashes always experienced where counter insurgents and terrorists Camps be overrun and troops ambushed by TOCs, insurgents and terrorists.

Nexus between Trans-National Criminal (TOC) and Terrorists

Crime-Terror-Insurgency Nexus. Terrorists and Insurgents increasingly are turning to TOC to generate funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), Money Laundering outfits carrying out X-rated money transactions through Bureau De Change (BDC) threatening the Nigerian state are associated with terrorist groups.

The table below illustrates the convergence between TOCs and terrorists. Figure1

S/N	Trans-National Organized Crime	Terrorism
1	Any activity must be gainful	Aims maximal success at every operation
2	Use of violence and bribery for the accomplishment and protection of their interests.	Attacks, Intimidation and Violence
3	Intelligence gathering/infiltration	Intelligence gathering/infiltration
4	Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons	Trade and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons
5	Leveraging Porous borders and gullible Border communities	Route is mostly unmanned borders/winning hearts and minds of locals for entry and concealment of identity
6	Establish linkages with foreign partners	Establish Trans-national connection of terror organizations
7	Relies on illicit/slush funds for operation and survival	Illicit funds for operation and survival.
8	Consolidate their connections with militant, ethnic, and religious movements.	Affiliating in fraternity with common ethnic and religious group.
9	It involves the crossing of borders or national jurisdictions.	Involves the crossing of borders or national jurisdictions.
10	Shortchange the national economy in currency counterfeiting, illegal exchange trading in contraband goods	Kidnapping for ransom for the release of captives

Challenges of Combating TOC and Terrorism

i. Lack of Robust Collaboration between State and Non-State Actors in Counter-TOC and Terrorism

The power for legitimize effective responses to insecurity largely continue to reside with nation-states. The state most times gets overwhelmed by the barrage of threats it is confronted with. As a consequence, states remain the pivotal actors, but their ability to ensure

the provision of security unilaterally is seen as more and more limited. States, therefore, have to coordinate their efforts with more actors using a more diverse set of modes of coordination. Scholars have described these changes as 'governance without government' (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992) or 'governance beyond the nation-state' (Zürn, 1998).

Weak governance facilitates TOC to fester a symbiosis with politics, hindering development and reducing the capacity of states to manage social tension and conflict. As a result, the convergence of TOC, state failure, Terrorism and armed conflict poses an increasingly obvious threat to security. Their activities only spread violence, corruption, conflict and economic sabotage.

ii. Un/ Mis-Governed Spaces

According to Jah and Iruonagbe (2021) The criminals assume full control of the ungoverned spaces thereby having the Nigerian state to de-assume full sovereignty. Government's control of these areas could only reflect in- principle. Depredators establish cells, sanctuaries which thus far metamorphosed into safe havens. Julum and Evans (2015) state that in ungoverned spaces, non-state actors are fillers of state authorities, establishing their writ as alternative power centres, supplanting the functionality of the state. The spaces termed 'ungoverned' usually come under the control of warlords, tribal leaders and criminal gangs with established physical presence in control of carved territory within existing state boundaries and having the capacity to challenge the legitimacy, authority and sovereignty of the country.

Trinkunas and Clunan (2010) contend that one cannot talk about ungoverned spaces without talking about failed states. They define ungoverned spaces as social, political and economic zones where states do not have effective control, which non-state actors can exploit to avoid state surveillance and undermine state sovereignty. They go further to argue that when analyzing ungoverned spaces, scholars should not limit themselves to failed states alone but also consider the lack of effective sovereignty in organized and strong states like in border areas and inner cities that tend to harbor criminals.

According to International Peace Institute IPI Blue Paper(2009), The Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime are:

1. Transnational organized crime (TOC) is no longer just a matter for specialist criminal organizations: it is now an essential strategic activity for many armed groups around the world, and a source of funding for terrorists, corrupt politicians, warlords, and rogue governments. Globalization facilitates partnerships between transnational criminal networks and actors in areas of armed conflict and weak governance, rewarding those who have a "comparative advantage in the production of illegality" by connecting them to global markets.

2. Multilateral institutions currently lack the necessary analytical and operational tools to understand and effectively respond to these clandestine connections. Instead, they fall back on crime-fighting methods—such as the international drug-control regime and national policing tools—that were designed to deal with organized crime before these strategically dangerous connections among crime, conflict, and corruption fully emerged. Even where international organizations do identify criminal networks, they have few tools at their disposal to fight them, and little leverage over national law-enforcement tools.

3. States and international organizations have largely failed to anticipate the evolution of TOC into a strategic threat to governments, societies, and economies. And while existing international arrangements such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the "Palermo Convention") and the international drug-control regime provide

frameworks for coordinated national law enforcement, they do little to create incentives for changing behavior or increasing national efforts to eradicate TOC.

At present, there are few incentives for states and private actors to combat TOC, especially where the costs of TOC, such as drug trafficking, are seen as falling on other communities or actors. Because some of the costs, such as the corrosion of state capacity and corruption, are "slow-burners," states often have few incentives to act in the short term to arrest TOC's growth and impact. And since the costs of TOC often fall on other countries or future governments, current governments can avoid taking strong, immediate action against TOC. In some cases, government officials may even come under direct and highly persuasive pressure from TOC to turn a blind eye—or even to assist. Once the impacts of TOC reach a certain tipping point, however, their effects can be devastating, as we have seen in Mexico, Colombia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, and beyond. TOC corrodes all the states and societies through which it passes, ultimately passing costs on to them all.

Nonetheless, the cumulative effects of TOC in corroding state capacity, economic stability, and public health are potentially enormous. In some parts of the world, they may even threaten the effective functioning of states (as we see in West Africa and parts of Afghanistan), with enormous potential spillover costs to other states. TOC amplifies and transmits other security challenges, such as armed conflict, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and even disease, while undermining the capacity of states, societies, and the international system to respond.

Conclusion

Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism pose tremendous threats to peace, security and stability of Northern Nigeria. With the opportunity of using border route by the 'duo devil', they become intertwined switching from TOC to terrorists and vice versa. They share swathes and created proto states. Adopting a multi-level governance, by way of devolving security powers or centri-fugal forces to sub-nationals creates much more impact than the unitary system of military operations. Security governance presupposes the involvement of all and sundry: the State, Non- Governmental Organization, Private security approach to combating/ countering TOC/terrorism.

Recommendations

i. Build International Capacities, Cooperation and Partnership to fight against Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism which require the exertion of political capital and effective law enforcement and criminal justice capacities.
ii. TOC and terrorism threaten the security and well-being of people in Nigeria and affect negatively the Nigerian economy. TOC and terrorism can be defeated with the required political will to address the threats of the duo devils.
iii. Northern Nigeria should leverage the Regional Development Commissions (North East Development Commission, North Central Development Commission and North West Development Commission) to prioritize physical security.
iv. There should be partnership with countries able to contribute key law enforcement resources, other donors, and the United Nations to launch a new International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support Program to enhance policing and law enforcement capacity in ungoverned spaces.
v. The state should leverage all available assets to enhance counterterrorism capacity building by centri-fugal forces to sub-national authorities.
vi. Implement a public diplomacy strategy to reduce the demand for illicit goods and services that fuels Trans-national Organized Crime.

vii. Nigeria should create robust collaboration/ partnerships with other donors, private sector experts, nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, the media, and academia that focus on supporting political will for criminal justice reform.

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