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REFRAMING IRANIAN AGENCY: STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY AND RATIONAL ADAPTATION IN THE NUCLEAR STANDOFF, 2002–2022

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ABSTRACT
Dominant Western narratives often portray Iran's nuclear behaviour as ideologically rigid, unpredictable, or inherently defiant. This paper challenges this interpretation by arguing that Iran's nuclear and diplomatic conduct between 2002 and 2022 reflected strategic reciprocity and rational adaptation to external pressures. Employing qualitative documentary analysis and process tracing, the study analyses International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, United Nations Security Council resolutions, official diplomatic records, sanctions regimes, and relevant literature on coercive diplomacy and nuclear governance. The findings reveal a consistent pattern in which Iran expanded uranium enrichment, increased centrifuge deployment, and reduced aspects of international monitoring in response to unilateral sanctions and perceived diplomatic inconsistency, while demonstrating a conditional willingness to negotiate under credible multilateral arrangements offering political and economic incentives. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) represents a notable instance of reciprocal compliance, whereas the United States' "maximum pressure" campaign after 2018 was followed by calibrated nuclear escalation aimed at restoring bargaining leverage without overtly pursuing weaponisation. Drawing on neoclassical realism and constructivism, the paper argues that Iran's nuclear policy was shaped by the interaction of regime security, domestic political dynamics, sovereignty concerns, and strategic calculations rather than ideological irrationality. The study concludes that coercive strategies lacking credible reciprocity are more likely to generate adaptive resistance than policy compliance. Effective non-proliferation diplomacy, therefore, requires predictable sequencing, institutional credibility, verifiable reciprocity, and recognition of both sovereignty concerns and material security interests. The paper contributes to debates on nuclear diplomacy, adversary behaviour, and the limits of coercive non-proliferation strategies in asymmetric international conflicts.

Keywords: Coercive diplomacy, Iran, Nuclear diplomacy, Reciprocity, Strategic adaptation

INTRODUCTION
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme has remained one of the most contested international security issues of the twenty-first century. Since the 2002 disclosure of undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, Iran has occupied a central position within debates concerning nuclear proliferation, coercive diplomacy, sanctions enforcement, and regional deterrence dynamics (Tabatabai, 2020; Beasley & Mehvar, 2025). Successive United States administrations, European governments, and regional actors have frequently framed Iranian nuclear behaviour as ideologically motivated, strategically deceptive, or inherently destabilising (Kroenig, 2012; Kroenig, 2022). Such portrayals have shaped sanctions regimes, diplomatic strategies, and broader international perceptions regarding the Iranian state.

However, empirical developments between 2002 and 2022 reveal a more complex and strategically adaptive pattern of behaviour than dominant threat narratives often acknowledged. Across multiple phases of confrontation and negotiation, Iranian nuclear conduct consistently reflected calibrated responses to external pressure, diplomatic opportunity, and institutional credibility. Periods of credible multilateral engagement and sanctions relief generally corresponded with expanded Iranian cooperation and compliance with international verification mechanisms, while periods characterised by unilateral coercion and inconsistent diplomatic commitments frequently produced reciprocal escalation in enrichment activity and monitoring restrictions (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2016; IAEA, 2021; Parsi, 2017; Vaez & Sadjadpour, 2023)).

This behavioural pattern became particularly visible following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 and the subsequent United States withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. Under the JCPOA, Iran accepted substantial limitations on enrichment levels, centrifuge deployment, uranium stockpiles, and reactor redesign in exchange for phased sanctions relief and reintegration into global economic systems (IAEA, 2016). Conversely, the re-imposition of unilateral sanctions under the United States "maximum pressure" campaign coincided with incremental Iranian breaches of JCPOA limitations, including increased enrichment levels and reduced access to monitoring (IAEA, 2019; Davenport, 2021). Importantly, these escalatory measures remained calibrated and reversible rather than constituting the immediate pursuit of nuclear weaponisation.

This article argues that Iranian nuclear and diplomatic conduct between 2002 and 2022 is best understood through the concept of strategic reciprocity. Strategic reciprocity refers to a pattern of calibrated state behaviour in which escalation, compliance, negotiation, and deterrent signaling are conditioned by perceptions of external credibility, sequencing, and reciprocity. Unlike simplistic deterrence models or narratives of ideological irrationality, strategic reciprocity captures how states operating under asymmetrical pressure, preserve bargaining leverage while avoiding catastrophic escalation (Jervis, 1989; Fearon, 1997; Nephew, 2018)).

The article contributes to existing scholarship in three principal ways. First, it reframes Iranian agency as strategic and adaptive rather than inherently ideological or irrational. Second, it integrates neoclassical realist and constructivist approaches to explain how systemic pressure, domestic legitimacy, and sovereignty narratives interact in shaping nuclear diplomacy. Lastly, it demonstrates how calibrated escalation can function as a bargaining mechanism within prolonged coercive disputes rather than as straightforward evidence of offensive proliferation intent.

Methodologically, the study employs qualitative documentary analysis and process-tracing. Evidence is derived from IAEA safeguards reports, United Nations Security Council resolutions, JCPOA implementation documents, official Iranian statements, and peer-reviewed scholarly analyses. Process-tracing enables systematic examination of how specific external actions corresponded with Iranian policy adjustments over time (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2018).

The article proceeds in six sections. The next section reviews existing literature and develops the strategic reciprocity framework. Section three outlines the methodology. Section four analyses four major dimensions of Iranian strategic adaptation: calibrated nuclear escalation, conditional diplomatic engagement, asymmetric regional deterrence, and normative counter-framing. Section five discusses the broader theoretical and policy implications of the

findings. The conclusion summarises the paper's contribution to debates concerning non-proliferation diplomacy and adversary behaviour.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Scholarship on Iran's nuclear programme spans multiple theoretical traditions within International Relations and Security Studies. Realist approaches generally interpret Iranian behaviour through the logic of security competition, deterrence, and regional power balancing. Waltz (1981); Kroenig (2022); Smetana and Wunderlich (2021) argues that nuclear proliferation may stabilise regional balances under certain conditions by increasing deterrence capabilities, whereas Sagan (1996); Tannenwald (2018) contend that proliferation increases risks of organisational failure, accidental escalation, and strategic miscalculation. Within the Iranian context, offensive realist analyses frequently portray Iran as a revisionist actor seeking regional dominance through nuclear latency and proxy influence (Kroenig, 2012; Kroenig, 2022). By contrast, defensive realist perspectives argue that Iranian nuclear behaviour reflects deterrence-oriented responses to regime insecurity and external military pressure (Pillar, 2015; Tabatabai, 2020).

Realist scholarship successfully identifies the significance of systemic pressure and asymmetrical power competition in shaping Iranian strategic calculations. Nevertheless, many realist accounts reduce Iranian behaviour to reactive balancing without adequately explaining the interactive and reciprocal nature of escalation and negotiation. Such approaches often overlook how Iranian policymakers calibrated responses according to perceptions of diplomatic credibility and institutional consistency.

Liberal institutionalist scholarship focuses primarily on negotiation frameworks, sanctions relief mechanisms, verification systems, and international cooperation. Keohane (1984); Ikenberry (2020) argues that international institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty, lowering transaction costs, and establishing predictable rules of interaction. Within the Iranian case, liberal institutionalist analyses highlight the importance of the IAEA safeguards regime, multilateral diplomacy, and negotiated sequencing arrangements under the JCPOA framework (Parsi, 2017; International Crisis Group 2022). The JCPOA itself represented one of the most comprehensive examples of institutionalised nuclear verification in modern non-proliferation diplomacy (IAEA, 2016).

Parsi (2017); International Crisis Group (2022) argues that the agreement reflected pragmatic bargaining rather than ideological reconciliation. According to this interpretation, both the United States and Iran pursued a negotiated compromise because sustained confrontation imposed escalating economic and strategic costs. Similarly, Fitzpatrick (2016); Beasley and Mehvar (2025) emphasises the technical sophistication of the verification regime and argues that the agreement significantly constrained Iranian breakout capacity.

However, liberal institutionalist perspectives sometimes portray Iran as a passive participant responding to externally structured diplomatic opportunities rather than as an active strategic actor shaping negotiation dynamics. These approaches insufficiently explain why institutional credibility and reciprocity proved so central to Iranian compliance decisions following the 2018 United States withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Constructivist scholarship emphasises identity, historical memory, legitimacy, and sovereignty narratives in shaping Iranian foreign policy behaviour. Takeyh (2021)highlights the enduring significance of anti-imperialist ideology and revolutionary identity within Iranian strategic culture. Similarly, constructivist analyses demonstrate how sovereignty

discourses and perceptions of Western double standards influenced Iranian resistance to external pressure (Beeman, 2008; Tabatabai, 2020).

Jervis (1989) further demonstrates how perception and misperception shape escalation dynamics within security crises, particularly under conditions of mutual distrust.

Although constructivist perspectives correctly identify the symbolic and normative dimensions of nuclear diplomacy, some accounts over emphasise ideological identity at the expense of pragmatic strategic calculation. Iranian behaviour across multiple negotiation cycles frequently demonstrated flexibility and adaptation inconsistent with rigid ideological determinism.

This article addresses these limitations through the concept of strategic reciprocity. Strategic reciprocity refers to a pattern of state behaviour in which nuclear and diplomatic conduct is calibrated according to perceptions of external credibility, consistency, and reciprocity. The framework operates through three interconnected mechanisms.

First, calibrated escalation involves incremental advances in enrichment activity, centrifuge deployment, or monitoring restrictions designed to increase bargaining leverage without triggering direct military confrontation or irreversible diplomatic isolation (Fearon, 1997; Nephew, 2017; Jervis, 1989). Escalation, therefore, functions not as uncontrolled aggression but as strategic signaling.

In addition, conditional engagement refers to the willingness to negotiate and comply under credible multilateral arrangements providing verifiable economic and political incentives. Under this logic, compliance depends not solely upon coercive pressure but upon confidence that reciprocal commitments will be implemented predictably (Parsi, 2017).

Furthermore, normative counter-framing involves strategic use of international law, treaty rights, and sovereignty discourse to legitimise state behaviour while delegitimising unilateral coercion. Such framing enables states to preserve domestic legitimacy and international diplomatic support during periods of confrontation (Beeman, 2008; Tabatabai,2020).

The framework integrates neoclassical realism and constructivism. Neoclassical realism explains how systemic pressures are filtered through domestic political calculations, elite perceptions, and regime-security concerns (Rose, 1998; Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2017). Constructivism complements this explanation by illuminating how sovereignty narratives, identity signaling, and legitimacy concerns shape state responses within international institutions.

Together, these approaches provide a more comprehensive explanation of Iranian behaviour than mono-theoretical models centred exclusively upon ideology, coercion, or material power. Iranian nuclear diplomacy consistently reflected interaction between strategic calculation, institutional credibility, domestic legitimacy, and normative signaling.

METHODOLOGY

This study employs a qualitative case-study methodology using documentary analysis and process-tracing. Qualitative methodology is appropriate because the research seeks to explain causal mechanisms, strategic signaling, and adaptive behaviour within a prolonged diplomatic confrontation rather than establish statistical correlations between isolated variables (Yin, 2018).

The temporal scope covers the period between 2002 and 2022, beginning with the disclosure of undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak and concluding with stalled efforts to revive the JCPOA following the United States withdrawal and subsequent escalation cycle. This twenty-year period encompasses multiple phases of negotiation, sanctions expansion, diplomatic engagement, agreement implementation, unilateral withdrawal, and reciprocal escalation.

The study relies primarily upon documentary evidence derived from official international reports, diplomatic agreements, sanctions frameworks, and peer-reviewed scholarly literature. Primary sources include IAEA safeguards reports, United Nations Security Council resolutions, JCPOA implementation documents, official Iranian statements, and legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These sources were selected because of their direct relevance to nuclear governance, verification, and diplomatic sequencing.

Secondary sources include scholarly analyses concerning nuclear deterrence, sanctions diplomacy, coercive bargaining, and Iranian foreign policy. Particular attention is devoted to peer-reviewed literature and publications from established academic presses to ensure evidentiary credibility and analytical reliability.

Process-tracing is employed to identify causal sequences linking external pressure to Iranian policy responses (George & Bennett, 2005). This method allows systematic examination of how sanctions, diplomatic incentives, institutional credibility, and military signaling influenced Iranian escalation and engagement decisions across different phases of the standoff.

The analysis focuses on four interrelated dimensions of Iranian strategic adaptation:

i. calibrated nuclear escalation.
ii. conditional diplomatic engagement;
iii. asymmetric regional deterrence; and
iv. normative and legal counter-framing.

These dimensions recur consistently within both primary documentation and broader scholarship on Iranian nuclear diplomacy. Triangulation across multiple documentary sources strengthens analytical reliability by enabling comparative verification of factual claims and policy developments.

The study recognises several limitations. Restricted access to classified Iranian internal deliberations constrains direct examination of elite decision-making processes. Additionally, political sensitivity surrounding nuclear diplomacy complicates complete transparency concerning strategic intentions. These limitations are mitigated through reliance upon verifiable public documentation and cross-source comparison.

FINDINGS

Calibrated Nuclear Escalation

Iran's most visible adaptive strategy involved incremental nuclear escalation in response to diplomatic breakdowns and coercive pressure. Following disclosure of the Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002, Iran initially pursued negotiations with the European Union Three (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), temporarily suspending enrichment activities under the 2003 Tehran Declaration (Takeyh, 2009). However, failure to secure durable sanctions relief or long-term security guarantees contributed to renewed enrichment activities after 2005.

The pattern became significantly more pronounced following the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. The re-imposition of unilateral sanctions under the "maximum pressure" strategy corresponded with gradual Iranian breaches of JCPOA restrictions (Davenport, 2021). According to IAEA monitoring reports, Iran progressively exceeded the agreement's enrichment cap of 3.67 per cent uranium-235, later enriching uranium to 20 per cent and eventually 60 per cent purity under continued safeguards monitoring (IAEA, 2019; IAEA, 2021).

Importantly, escalation remained calibrated rather than unlimited. Iran did not formally withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), expel all inspectors, or publicly pursue weaponisation. Instead, Iranian officials consistently framed escalation as reversible and contingent upon reciprocal sanctions relief. Such measures functioned as bargaining instruments intended to restore negotiating leverage while avoiding military confrontation or total diplomatic isolation.

This pattern aligns closely with theories of coercive signaling and bargaining under asymmetrical conditions (Fearon, 1997; Nephew, 2017). Escalation increased pressure upon negotiating counterparts while preserving diplomatic flexibility. Iranian conduct, therefore, reflected strategic calculation rather than uncontrolled ideological defiance.

Economic pressure significantly shaped this adaptive strategy. United States sanctions severely reduced Iranian oil exports and constrained access to international financial systems following 2018 (International Energy Agency, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2022). Under these conditions, calibrated escalation enabled Iranian policymakers to impose diplomatic costs upon external actors without crossing explicit weaponisation thresholds likely to trigger overwhelming retaliation.

The calibrated nature of Iranian escalation also reflected broader deterrence considerations. Israeli officials repeatedly signaled willingness to undertake preventive military action against perceived weaponisation efforts, while United States military deployments in the Persian Gulf reinforced deterrent pressure (Kroenig, 2014; Kroenig, 2020). Iranian restraint, therefore, reflected awareness of escalation boundaries within a hostile regional security environment.

Conditional Diplomatic Engagement

Alongside escalation, Iranian behaviour repeatedly demonstrated willingness to pursue negotiated compromise under credible multilateral frameworks offering reciprocal incentives. This conditional engagement appeared most clearly during the diplomatic process leading to the JCPOA in 2015.

The JCPOA imposed substantial restrictions upon Iranian nuclear activities. Iran reduced its enriched uranium stockpile by approximately 98 per cent, limited enrichment levels to 3.67 per cent, redesigned the Arak heavy-water reactor, reduced operational centrifuge numbers, and accepted extensive IAEA monitoring provisions (IAEA, 2016). In return, sanctions relief enabled renewed oil exports and partial reintegration into international financial systems.

Economic incentives played a major role in sustaining Iranian engagement. Following the implementation of the JCPOA, Iranian oil exports increased substantially, and previously frozen overseas assets became partially accessible (World Bank, 2017; International Energy Agency, 2023). The agreement, therefore, demonstrated how reciprocal incentives could

facilitate extensive non-proliferation compliance even under conditions of profound political mistrust.

Iranian officials consistently framed participation in the JCPOA as pragmatic rather than ideological. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly emphasised that the agreement represented a tactical arrangement designed to alleviate economic pressure while preserving Iran's sovereign nuclear rights (Khamenei, 2015). Such framing reflected domestic political balancing between ideological legitimacy and economic necessity.

The collapse of the agreement following the United States withdrawal significantly reinforced Iranian distrust toward unilateral commitments. Nevertheless, Iran did not entirely abandon diplomacy. Indirect negotiations aimed at restoring the agreement continued intermittently between 2021 and 2022 under European mediation (International Crisis Group, 2022). Iranian demands focused primarily upon guarantees against future unilateral withdrawal and verifiable sequencing of sanctions relief.

These developments illustrate a central component of strategic reciprocity: compliance remained conditional upon perceptions of institutional credibility and reciprocal implementation. Coercion alone did not produce durable compliance. Rather, Iranian cooperation expanded when diplomatic arrangements appeared predictable and enforceable.

Asymmetric Regional Deterrence

Iran also relied upon asymmetric regional deterrence to complement nuclear diplomacy and compensate for conventional military asymmetry. Through relationships with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and Houthi forces in Yemen, Iran cultivated networks capable of imposing strategic costs upon adversaries indirectly (International Crisis Group, 2020).

These proxy relationships expanded Iran's deterrent capabilities without requiring direct conventional confrontation with the United States or Israel. Regional signaling intensified particularly during periods of sanctions escalation and diplomatic breakdown. For example, attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 and missile strikes against United States facilities in Iraq following the killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 demonstrated calibrated retaliatory capability under conditions of heightened confrontation (CSIS, 2020; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023).

Importantly, these actions also reflected strategic restraint. Iranian missile strikes following Soleimani's assassination were calibrated to avoid mass casualties likely to trigger uncontrolled escalation (Cordesman, 2020). Such behaviour aligns with broader patterns of reciprocal signaling visible within Iran's nuclear diplomacy.

Asymmetric deterrence, therefore, complemented rather than replaced diplomatic engagement. Regional signaling intensified when negotiation channels weakened and de-escalated during periods of active diplomacy. This interaction between regional deterrence and nuclear negotiation reflects a broader strategy aimed at preserving bargaining leverage under asymmetrical security conditions.

Normative and Legal Counter-Framing

Iran consistently employed legal and normative discourse to legitimise its nuclear activities and challenge unilateral sanctions. Iranian officials repeatedly invoked Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognises the right of member states to pursue peaceful nuclear technology under safeguards arrangements (United Nations, 1968).

This legal framing enabled Iran to portray uranium enrichment as a sovereign entitlement rather than evidence of offensive proliferation intent. Iranian diplomacy frequently emphasised perceived inconsistencies within the global non-proliferation regime, particularly regarding Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal and non-participation in the NPT framework (Takeyh, 2021).

Normative counter-framing extended beyond rhetorics into formal legal action. In 2018, Iran initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice concerning United States sanctions under the 1955 Treaty of Amity (ICJ, 2018). Although the proceedings did not eliminate sanctions, they reinforced Iran's broader diplomatic narrative, portraying unilateral coercion as inconsistent with international legal obligations.

Domestically, sovereignty discourse strengthened regime legitimacy by framing resistance to sanctions as a defence of national independence and technological rights. Internationally, such framing complicated efforts to sustain unified diplomatic coalitions against Tehran, particularly among non-aligned states skeptical of unilateral coercion.

Constructivist scholarship helps explain the significance of this strategy. Sovereignty narratives and identity-based legitimacy concerns shaped not only domestic political discourse but also international diplomatic positioning (Beeman, 2008; McCourt, 2014). Normative counter-framing, therefore, formed an integral component of Iran's broader strategy of strategic reciprocity.

DISCUSSION

The findings demonstrate that Iranian nuclear behaviour between 2002 and 2022 was fundamentally strategic, reciprocal, and adaptive rather than irrational or purely ideological. Across multiple phases of confrontation and negotiation, Iranian conduct consistently reflected assessments of external credibility, institutional consistency, and regime-security considerations.

Theoretically, the study challenges mono-causal explanations of Iranian behaviour. Realist perspectives correctly identify the importance of structural insecurity and asymmetrical power competition but often underestimate the interactive nature of reciprocal signaling. Liberal institutionalist approaches illuminate the significance of negotiation frameworks and verification systems, yet they insufficiently explain why institutional credibility proved so central to sustaining compliance. Constructivist analyses capture the importance of sovereignty narratives and historical identity, but sometimes understate pragmatic strategic calculation.

The strategic reciprocity framework integrates these dimensions by demonstrating how material pressure, institutional trust, and normative legitimacy interact simultaneously within Iranian decision-making. Iranian escalation generally corresponded with perceptions of diplomatic inconsistency or coercive asymmetry, while engagement expanded under credible multilateral arrangements offering reciprocal incentives.

The findings also refine broader theories of coercive diplomacy and nuclear bargaining. Traditional sanctions-based strategies frequently assume that escalating economic pressure necessarily compels compliance. However, the Iranian case demonstrates that coercion absent credible reciprocity often generates adaptive resistance and calibrated escalation rather than capitulation (Fearon, 1997; Tannenwald, 2018)).

Several policy implications emerge from this analysis.

i. Durable non-proliferation agreements require institutional credibility and reciprocal sequencing. Agreements vulnerable to unilateral reversal create incentives for adaptive escalation and reduce long-term trust.
ii. Diplomatic flexibility remains essential even during periods of heightened confrontation. Complete isolation narrows negotiation space and increases reliance upon coercive signaling mechanisms.
iii. Recognition of sovereignty concerns and domestic legitimacy pressures is critical for understanding state behaviour within asymmetrical disputes.

These implications extend beyond Iran. Strategic reciprocity may offer a useful framework for analysing other prolonged nuclear disputes characterised by asymmetrical coercion, including negotiations involving North Korea and broader debates concerning sanctions effectiveness within international security politics.

CONCLUSION

This article argued that Iranian nuclear and diplomatic conduct between 2002 and 2022 is best understood through the framework of strategic reciprocity. Rather than acting irrationally or purely ideologically, Iran consistently calibrated escalation, negotiation, deterrent signaling, and normative discourse according to perceptions of external credibility, institutional consistency, and regime-security requirements.

The analysis demonstrates that periods of credible multilateral engagement generally corresponded with expanded Iranian compliance and diplomatic cooperation, whereas unilateral coercion and inconsistent implementation frequently generated reciprocal escalation. Importantly, such escalation remained calibrated and reversible rather than constituting immediate pursuit of weaponisation.

The study contributes to knowledge in three principal ways. First, it reframes Iranian agency as strategically adaptive rather than inherently irrational or exclusively ideological. Second, it integrates neoclassical realist and constructivist insights to explain how material insecurity, domestic legitimacy, and sovereignty narratives jointly shape nuclear diplomacy. Lastly, it demonstrates how calibrated escalation can function as a bargaining mechanism within asymmetrical international disputes.

The collapse of the JCPOA illustrates the fragility of agreements lacking durable political guarantees and reciprocal credibility. Conversely, the initial implementation phase of the agreement demonstrated that extensive non-proliferation compliance is achievable under conditions of predictable sequencing and institutional trust.

Ultimately, the Iranian case demonstrates that adversaries subjected to sustained coercion do not necessarily respond through irrational escalation or ideological rigidity. Rather, they frequently adapt strategically within perceived constraints, employing calibrated reciprocity to preserve bargaining leverage while avoiding catastrophic confrontation. Recognising this dynamic is essential for developing more effective approaches to nuclear diplomacy, regional stability, and long-term conflict management.

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