

## ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES ON THE ESCALATION OF FARMER-HERDERS CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN KADUNA 2011-2019

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### ABSTRACT

Violent Conflict is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, thus, its recent escalation between the rearing and farming communities in Kaduna state 2011-2019 has become major challenges that is yet to receive due attention. The response of the previous government was not enough inadequate. This gave rise to the escalation of the conflicts in the state. This therefore prompted the researcher and make it necessary to further investigate how the crises can be curtailed apprehended once and for all by the present government in place. Methodologically, the study explored the dynamic wave of government responses through qualitative design method. In-depth face to face interview and focus group discussion (fGD) were conducted with 29 participants in the affected area of the state. Documentaries and various reports were also utilised for triangulation of data using MAXQDA 2018 software for thematic analysis. Attitudes. Behaviour and contradictions variables of ABC Galtonian triangle model was adopted for interpretation. The findings show that several attitudinal as well as behavioural factors had influenced the approach of government in responding to the crises in the state. Lack of effective response in protecting lives and property such as prevention/early warning system signal emerged central in failure to apprehend the situation.

**Keywords:** Government, farmers, Herders, Response, Conflict

### Introduction

The world is currently moving in a high tension with conflicts everywhere. Throughout the processes of human development right from the primitive, Renaissance and the present day of digital world, man has engaged in an endless interaction in small and large groupings such as family unit, community and society. With the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the thirty years' war to dethrone religious hegemony in Europe came to an end, and this led to the emergence of the nation-states (Zainawa, 2014). In the various groups of human interactions, clashes of interest and values often result in conflicts. To Ocheja (2011), conflicts are therefore part of human association that could not be prevented, but controllable. As a result therefore, necessitated the formation of United Nations Organization in 1945 with the aim of evolving peaceful resolution mechanism to conflict situations among sovereign states and to prevent its occurrences in line with the peaceful agenda of the organization (Haliru, 2012). The quest for power among different nations of cultural and economic background normally result to clashes due to ideological variation (Rasaq,

et al. 2015). This situation led to the ravaging of mankind using first and Second World Wars experiences because of clashes of interest (Haliru, 2012). Furthermore, historical evidence has shown that various communities in different countries have experienced one form of conflict or the other because of either power, ethnicity or boundary issues etc. (Jacob, 2014).

Coming down to Africa, conflicts and crises are common features of the continent with many of such situation patting. For instance, the attack of Al- Shabab in Somalia, the ongoing Darfur crisis in Sudan, the Central African Republic crises, the Ethiopian conflicts, the democratic republic of Congo are few examples of the conflicts that continue to face he continent. The diversity of the continent by languages, culture, and religious practices were aggravated by colonial partitioning and re-alignment of the continent. The continent is so diverse that it consists of hundreds of ethnic groups speaking over 800 languages (Selassie, 1992).

Similarly, Nigeria being the ninth largest country in the world as well as largest black nation with a size of two-three european countries such as: Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, consists of diversities with high differences among its inhabitants is adversely affecting the process of achieving the goal of unity (Okpanachi, 2009; Eghosa, 2010). However, there are other countries with similar ethnic heterogeneity that were able to manage it and forged ahead. Adisa, (2015), Adesoji & Alao (2009) presented observed that, Malaysia comprises ethnic diversities but have taken its advantage to have better citizen's life and enjoy a reasonable progress, peace, and stability. In contrast to Nigeria, conflict of various nature has deterred the largest Black Country's development and unity due to existence of polarity among its citizens.

Ethnically diverse conscious countries such as Nigeria, suffer a set back and appear prominently among countries with civil wars and insurgency in the West African region (Vekatasawmy & Omeje, 2015). This however hypothesize that, having an equal proportion of Muslim and Christian population confirmed how religion and ethnicity play a role in determining the pace of development (Vekatasawmy & Omeje, 2015). Most of the West African states face similar challenges, with that of Nigeria been the highest due to its population of about 158 million. With Muslims as 77,300,000 and Christians as 78,050,000 representing 48.8% and 49.3% as at 2010 (Pewresearch Center, 2015). Additionally, the Muslims and Christians divides spread among large number of different ethnic tribes with varied socio-cultural and economic engagements of more than 250, with some estimates put at 350-400 and about 500 dialects (Ayatse & Iorhen, 2013). It is challenging to Nigeria, as it comprises over 250 ethnic groups, making series of inter and intra- ethnic, religious and socio-economic conflicts a major constraint to the country's nation building.

Of all the states in Nigeria, Kaduna state is one that has recorded a high number of conflicts, with the former state governor, El-rufai quoted to have said that over 20,000 deaths were recorded in the last few decades (Intervention, 2017). Okpanachi (2012) stated that, Kaduna is not the most ethnically divided state in Nigeria but having equal proportion of the two major religious divides (Islam and Christianity) and the diversity of socio-cultural and occupational activities of both the indigenous tribes and settlers in the state made it experiences conflict situation. Recent conflicts in Kaduna state are many, which include resource conflict between the Fulani-herders and farmers belonging to two different tribes and religion from 2011 to present time, and unknown gunmen's sporadic attacks. These renewed conflicts in southern Kaduna and neighboring states, the Shiites uprising with the military personnel in December 2015, the spillover effect of boko haram insurgwncy in the state, as well as the election conflicts including the last one in 2011.



Figure 1.1 Number of conflicts occurrences in Nigeria (1980-2017)  
 Source: National emergency management agency NEMA (Annual Reports 2012-2017).

The above figure 1.1 indicated that the year 2011 marked a huge shift and in fact, recorded the highest number of conflicts incidence and the numbers are relatively high until 2016 and decreased in 2017. Conflicts of various nature and its spillover effects have caused the systematic and continuous killing of thousands of innocent citizens in different part of the country and have raised several concerns such as the fundamental factors that cause these conflicts to occur. For example, as stated, the occurrence of conflict between different divides of socio-cultural, economic or religious can be seen starting from the year of 1980, and almost every year occurring until the present time. These conflict in Kaduna state involves students, farmers, settlers and the public. (see Figure 1.2 below).




Figure 1.2 Number of conflicts occurrences in Nigeria (by states) (1980-2017)  
 Source: National emergency management agency NEMA (Annual Reports 2012-2017)

In the context of Muslim Fulani herders and Christian farmers in Southern Kaduna state, these factors have also being echoed by Harris (2013), Angerbrandt (2015), Oke (2014), Tangban (2014) and Marcus (2015). However, there are several additional factors that are unique and specific to the various forms of conflicts in Kaduna such as the socio-economic/land usage and the introduction of Sharia legal system in the year of 2000 (Onapajo and Usman, 2015; JN1, 2005). Elections at the various level of governance in the state is another pertinent factor that causes conflict in Kaduna which normally last for some days, creating lost in lives and destruction of valuable properties (Aleyomi, 2012; John 2015; Arolowo 2011; Adebayo, 2010; Adisa and Adekunle, 2010; Sampson, 2014; Husseni, 2015).

Regarding the incessant and protracted resource conflict between Fulani herdsman and farmers in the country, the two communities engaged in related but different occupation of food production such as meat and dairy for human consumption. The Fulani herders move around in search for pourage land for animal

grassing especially in the dry season. However, due to population increase that heighten the demand and usage of wet land by the farmers, conflicts ensued between farmers and the Fulani's migrants in their struggle for land usage. Agriculture remains the central occupation of most heterogeneous Nigerians with varied socio-cultural, economic, political and religious orientation. Hence, conflicts situation continued with each tribe claiming ownership and control of the available natural resources (land, human and minerals) (Osegbue, 2017 & Adeoye, 2017). This creates degree of tension and conflicts situation leading to injuries, loss of lives and valuable resources. Both farmers and Fulani-herdsmen requires fertile and wet land for their occupation especially in the dry season.

Conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers has been on in some part of the country due to differences in weather condition which determines the movement and migration of the Fulani's for grassing. In state like Ekiti, Delta, Nasarawa, Benue and Enugu, violence and clashes had occurred that led to death and loss of farm production. In Kaduna state, the situation has taken a new dimension of ethnic, tribal and religion sentiments with devastating effects on the socio-economic lives of the people in the state. The escalation is raising fear that it could spread to other part of the country (northern and southern region) along religious divides. Hence, conflict situation in Kaduna state, has affected the lives of the people in general as well as the confidence of the people in governance.

Many efforts have been taken by the federal government to forge national unity, create peaceful coexistence and harmonious relationship to avoid conflicts situation among the diversities in the country. These efforts include formulation and implementation of policies that are institutional, in a form of policies and legislation, the political arrangement as well as socio-economic measures. The institutional measures such as National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), involve setting up of unity schools across the federation and the establishment of Federal Character commission in 1973, 1976 and 2005 respectively. Policy and legislative measures include poverty eradication program in 2002, National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (Needs) in 2004 and National Health Insurance Scheme in 2005. Political measures include devolution of power through state creation and the recent 2014 National Conference where all meant to balance the ethnic configuration, ameliorate tension and end the antagonistic relation that often leads to the spiral crises and hold the nation at ransom (Salawu, 2010). These measures have not been able to put a stop to the various forms of conflicts arising in the state and the country (Oji, 2014; Eme and Onyishi, 2014).

### **Literature Review**

Conflict studies related to farmers-herders have been extensively written by researchers, but their focus differ in terms of socio-economic, political, cultural and religious differences of the two groups but engaging in related economic activities. Other researchers argued from agricultural dimension, with some highlighting historical antecedents as a cause. For instance, clashes between the two groups is very critical as both of them constitute a large population of almost equal size. Additionally, both groups actively engage in similar economic activities requiring fertile land for production. From the various reports accessed, conflicts between them continued at different point in time, and the degree of damages to human, livestock and properties are paramount. Previously, scholars have claimed various causes for conflicts in general happening in the state. Some have argued it is due to ethnic dissimilarities between the various tribes in the state as Olatunji (2016) noted that conflict is a character of pluralist states. There are group of scholars such as Uji (2016), Amanambu & Umuobiala (2017) and Halliru (2018) whom also saw religion divides as the triggering point to the conflicts, while there are few scholars who stressed that it was due to the external activities of the existing terrorist/militancy /Boko Haram groups, especially in the present years). Although scholars have come up with some of these reasons for the occurrence of conflicts and several measures taken to response to it, but conflict between the duo continue to escalate different dimension.

However, conflicts between the fulani herdes and farming communities in the area persist and escalated from 2011 till date despite the submission by researchers. The situation is more intense within

2011-2018 as compared to pre 2011. Previous study on the conflict by Mench and Edward (2014) examines geographical nearness of the two communities leading to cohabitation. Olaniyan and Okeke Uzodueka (2015), Mbaeze and Nnaji (2018), Akinkumi (2018), Omleye and Segun (2018) pointed out that change in climatology leads to unwanted migration of the herding communities whereas Akinyele, Atelle (2014), Winkler (2017), Jumba (2018), Audu (2013) and Ladan (2014) on climate effects, natural resources and freshwater scarcity. Other scholars such as Uji (2016), Maingwa (2017), Amanambu & Umuobiala (2017) viewed the renewed attacks on religiosity and ethnic militias, this differences causes intolerance. On the conflict effects Akejobi, Ebira and Amuzie (2016), Alimba (2014); Halliru, Ezeonmuka and Igwe (2016), Adeoye (2017), McDougal (2015) highlighted on welfarism and livelihood of most families thereby reducing their income. Put differently, Ikezue and Ezeah (2017), Mohammad and Bibi (2015), Omokhoa and Okuchukwu (2018), Sunday (2013), Ladan, Dourotoy and Anyabe et.al (2014), (2018) & (2017) have presented encroachment and population upsurge as a point, with Eraye, Iyang and Ukpong (2017), Eke (2017) blaming authority for its negligence.

Given these highlights in the previous works of researchers, government often response is by 'force peace' using security personnel to immediately arrest the situation and bring peace and order in the affected areas. According to the reports in the previous works, authorities concern in many instances permanently stationed security personnel. Earlier on in the part of government, unification policies were introduced in the 70's and in the recent time to address the existing polarity among different nationalities of the Nigerian state. Such policies introduced covers educational, socio-economic as well as political. For instance, unity schools, national youth service corp scheme, principle of federalism for equal representation in governance, poverty alleviation programs, N-power, trader money and youths for agriculture program. However, despite all these, conflict continou to occur giving the need to look at the situation again between these two groups further deeper considering the escalation of the situation within the timeframe. Hence, this merit an investigation on why the escalation of the conflict by attacks and counter attacks between the two communities within 2011-2019, and how the escalation affects the involving communities and larger society as well?. Therefore, the believes that what seems to cause conflict in the first place might be dissimilar from the triggering factors leading to escalation overtime. Furthermore, the escalation of the conflicts in the Kaduna state according to Halliru, Omoleye & Okuchukwu (2018); Garba, Gaffey (2016) & Ajazeera report (2014) is affecting every tribe in the state and the country at large due to cosmopolitan nature of the state. This has therefore widened the tension in the country at anytime the conflicts broke out in the state. Kaduna is therefore, a miniature of the Nigerian state, with degree of political relevance representing the 19 northern states giving its geographical nearness to the capital of Nigeria is a reason to be reckoned with as stated by Omoleye & Segun (2018), Gyong (2013) and Mijah (2014).

Thus, this study examines government responses on the resource conflict between two groups of farming (Christian farmers) and animal grazing communities (Fulani's) in Southern Kaduna from 2011 till 2019, and how the conflict is affected and prolonged with damning effects beyond the actual conflicting issue.

## **Methodology**

The research used qualitative methods to allow for deeper inquiry and generate appropriate data for analyses and interpretation to narrate events instead of statistical numeration or figures on government responses. A total of 29 participants, 22 of them on face-to-face in-depth interviews and group of 7 men for focus group discussion (FGD) using a snowballing techniques. A semi structures question was provided based on the research objective with ideas emanating from the participants whom are active stake holders in the resource conflict between the two communities. In the descriptive analyses, MAXQDA 2018 software was used for coding to identify themes.

## Data Analysis

### Introduction

This study discusses about government responses on the escalation of conflict between the Muslim Fulani-herders and Christian farmers in southern Kaduna state. The ongoing Muslim Fulani-herdsmen and Christian farmers conflict in southern Kaduna has forced government at federal and state levels to respond to save the situation as submitted by the respondents in the interview processes. The responses on the emerged subthemes are: effective responses in protecting lives and properties, prevention/early warning system signal and community/NGO effort. All these themes will be discussed in subsequent sections.

### Theme One: Emergency Response

This is one of the major themes emerged from the respondents. Emergency responses mean actions taken by the government, federal and/or state. These responses are called emergency because it refers to immediate action taken by authority to calm the situation. Thus, it could be seen that, since the conflict persist, these are the responses taken in order to ease the situation, and at the same time, to prevent it from escalating. There were two emerged sub-themes using MAXQDA 2018 analytical tool as figure 5.1 & 2 indicated. Effective response and preventive mechanism to be explain further about the emergency responses.

### Effective Response

Effective response refers to the ability of the security agencies to respond to public safety by reducing the impact or consequences of a damaging situation such as conflict, earthquake, draught including incidence of crime scene. The primary threats and dangers posed by conflict are physical damages to people structures leading to loss of utilities. Given this, security agencies are to safeguard public by providing security support and sustainable responses in operations for recovery of peace (Ushe, 2015). Thus, security responses to conflict situation requires harmonization of law enforcement agencies, fire and medical services etc. Thus, the responses by the concern authorities according to the respondents is in two phases with some commending government effort (previous or present) giving the prolonged conflict, whereas others not.

The effectiveness or otherwise of the government responses is as follows. For instance, respondent A3 has praise government thus, "...give credit to the government first for ensuring relative peace in the area". Corroborating government effort to the situation, respondent A4 has commended the effort of government within a timeline given the persistent of the conflict and stating that the previous government have done well, thus:

*"From 2011-2015 the government really tried. If not for the effort of the government, we wouldn't have had this pesace today. During this period there was enough security in the area and they did their job very well"*(In-depth interview with respondent A4, 6<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

Similarly, respondent B9 appreciated the effort/responses of government on the lingering situation thus, "...In fact, we must show our appreciation to the state and the federal governments, because when this started, we made efforts to reconcile". This credit according to the respondents is to the previous administration in timeline series in the state upon which the conflict has transcend. Contrary to the viewpoint of A4 above, respondents B9 and E7 see more effort by the present government than the previous, thus:

*"This present government however not only stopped the situation but also arrested the alleged perpetrators from both sides which they promised to prosecute for justice to take its course. They are presently in their custody"* (In-depth interview with respondent B9, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017). *"As we have different government which brought security formations to Kafanchan. The area is relatively calm now because these security formations can monitor the situation and take action from forward operation base"* (In-depth interview with respondent E7, 13<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

In line with respondent B9 that commended the present effort, respondent C19 generalized all responses to the conflict's occurrences in the state by the government of Kaduna state and the Nigerian federal government as performing lower than the present thus:

*"I think from 1989 to date sentiment aside the best government that we ever had in this country and in Kaduna state that tried to look at this problem holistically and bring normalcy, peace and tranquility is nobody else than His Excellency the present governor Mallam Nasiru Ahmed El-Rufa'I So, we must thank his Excellency the executive governor of Kaduna state and the president Muhammadu Buhari for bringing relative peace not only to this place but the entire country".* (In-depth interview with respondent C19, 9<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

To be more precise on these effort by the present administration as popularized by respondents above, however respondent D21 claimed that, "...government has also dispatched security to the region and the governor was there personally to evaluate and to pacify people, even though, the youths threw stones at his motorcade". In addendum, 2<sup>nd</sup> FGD discussant expresses the hitches government is facing in responding to the Fulani-herdsmen and farmers conflict in the area thus:

*"...government is doing something to solve the crisis, but the issue lies in nailing the perpetrators of these attacks especially when most of them are foreigners. It is easy to get the local Fulani's, but the foreign ones who fled the area immediately they attack are the major problems"* (2<sup>nd</sup> FGD discussant, 21<sup>st</sup> November 2017).

On the other hand, other respondents have seen the responses of government to the situation as "partial response" who argued that the response will not be commended because it has taking side. According to this viewpoint, government treat one group in the conflict with softness while the other group not. For instance, respondent E1 thus,

*"...government was making effort but because they have already allowed one of the sides to feel and conceive that it (the government) belong to a particular section. Sometimes the response by security agencies is usually too delayed"* (In-depth interview with respondent E1, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2017).

Similar argument was made by respondent A2 who justify the partial response of government on the conflict, thus:

*"...government did not set up IDP camps despite our continuous outcry. As far as they are concerned based on what we understand, IDP camps can only be established in where Hausa Fulani Muslims are involved". "...very poor effort like I said. Number one government has refused to play its own role to send troops into the bushes"* (In-depth interview with respondent A2, 25<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

Acknowledging government effort and responses but loss confidence, respondent A5 have this to say, "...government is playing the role of adjudication, playing the role of trying to see that the killings stop. What methodology is being used is the one that is questionable". While describing the scenario of how the partial response of government is, respondent C13, said:

*"Government only reacts when the people who are attacked start up to defend themselves, may be when few Fulani's get killed. But whenever our own people are killed and there is no sign that any of the Fulani's was killed, the government doesn't normally care. These are some of the things we have noticed. There were times when the Fulani's were caught but were released to come back and attack again. If you go to some of the communities, people would tell you the names of some of those they captured who were later released by the government"* (In-depth interview with respondent C13, 20<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

This shows that, "...It is only when government has interests that they tend to take some visible actions" 6<sup>th</sup> FGD discussant added.

However, summarizing the above narrative thought of views on government effective and partial responses to the persistent farmer-herders conflict in southern Kaduna, respondent D20 stresses that the responses of government to the situation is neither effective and nor partial but inadequate and poor to handle and address the situation. He disclosed his concern thus, "...you can't say they have not been doing, but the issue is that they need to do more. I know the government has set up a peace commission, but the questions remain are the people appointed competent to handle the issues?". This was restated by respondent C18 and C15 thus, "...the government of Kaduna state and even at the federal level I would say have not done much or what the government was doing was not being appreciated". Highlighting more impetus on the inadequacy/poor response by government, respondents C14 and C13:

*"Government was very slow in acting in Southern Kaduna crisis. Their slow action made the crisis to escalate".*

*"So, there is general resentment against the lackadaisical attitude of the government in handling the crisis and that is why people, particularly women have been demonstrating naked. It was only this year when the crisis became serious that the government started sending police and army to Southern Kaduna"* (In-depth interview with respondent C14, 1<sup>st</sup> November 2017).

This argument was supported by respondent B8, A2 thus, "...of recent however, the response system has been very weak. If there is any reported crisis before the army or the police is deployed a lot of damage has been done". Concluding this argument in a clear term, respondent B11, thus "...when he was attacked (the governor), because he has a golden life more precious than ours, they started sending armored cars coming to southern Kaduna after the damage was done. I can tell this to his eyes". As the responses of government takes variety of opinion above by respondents, another respondent sees it from different viewpoint and accused government for zero action but NGOs. For instance, respondent B8 stated:

*"Actually, nothing from the part of the government! If we are talking of government, I am part of the government because I am an APC member and I voted for the party. Even the relative peace we are enjoying is the effort of the NGOs"* (In-depth interview with respondent B8, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

However, there is little agreement on the zero action of government above by respondent A3 were he sighted example on a policy initiative "religious bill" by government but was faulted along the way due to lack of sensitisation thus,

*"...I will commend some of El-Rufa'i policies like this religious bill to regulate preaching, it will have helped. However, where government failed is its failure to sensitize and educate people on the policy before you begin to implement them"* (In-depth interview with respondent A3, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

Therefore, from the responses of interviewees above on effort responses on the persistent Fulani-herdsmen and farmers conflict in southern Kaduna, government played a little role though with much accusations and blames as presented by the respondents. For this reason, it is necessary for the government and the concern authorities on the matter to do more in performing its necessary and primary function of maintaining law and order. Giving the respondents submissions, government have not cultivated self-awareness in the minds of the citizens regarding physical and emotional reactions to conflict situation.

The works of Adeoye (2017), Ukpong (2017), and Jumba (2018) and various reports on the lingering conflict asserts that effective conflict management revolves around setting up a safer environment by employing a pragmatic strategy to see the end of the escalation. Using Galtonian conflict resolution model, authorities need to harmonise laws to accommodate as well as aggregate all the societal values giving the heterogeneity to minimise or if possible, avoid contradictions among groups that often escalate arising



conflicting issues and concern. The model highlighted that little democratic means of resolving disputes, unequal treatment of citizens, heightening poverty, unfair judicial system etc are sign of weak system and a sure banker to conflict escalation.

### **Preventive Mechanism/Early Action**

Prevention of conflict involves a wide range of policies and actions aimed to prevent violence occurrence from dispute. From the findings, the government do not take actions in terms of preventive mechanism or early action needed for effective monitoring and stabilization of possible conflict issues before outbreak such as early warning signal mechanism; aids to prevent the conflict; and to commit persons (possible victims/actors) in the idea of conflict prevention.

Yerima (2016) stated that prevention of conflict revolves around focusing on diplomacy for long term initiative by committing resources. Respondent A1 narrated on the failure of government in the first place by not checkmating the accessibilities of weaponries as a first preventive measure to a conflict happening. He believes that prevention is better than curing, thus,

*"...since the authorities didn't do anything, they go about brandishing these weapons to chase hundreds of people. The authorities ought to have enforced laws where neither the natives nor the Fulani's should be allowed to carry any sophisticated weapon"* (In-depth interview with respondent A1, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2017).

Another respondent A5 noted that government responses mostly come after conflict and not before thus:

*"Why must it be after killings have been made? Must we wait until people die and houses are burnt before you make a visit? You already know that this conflict exit, so there should be a mechanism in place to prevent an outbreak. ...government also must block the avenues where the Fulani's get offensive weapons including AK47, or else the crisis is likely to continue"* (In-depth interview with respond A5, 6<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

Meanwhile FGD discussants put it as government doesn't involve specialist in its responsive processes. This according to them will compliments its (government) effort describing that:

*"...government is not working with the real actors who are specialists in the area that can be able to intervene in this matter. They just feel that they are government and there is no effective management of the crisis"* (Discussant 1 FGD, 21<sup>st</sup> November 2017).

Supporting the poor preventive mechanism viewpoint by the present government 2<sup>nd</sup> discussant in FGD added that,

*"...that is why people would continue to remember the former governor Ahmed Makarfi because he meets people one on one. Meeting or seeing him is nothing beyond talking to the SA on interfaith matters and the next thing is an appointment being arranged with him for you"* (2<sup>nd</sup> FGD discussant, 21<sup>st</sup> November 2017).

But according to him, the present government thus, "...most often doesn't involve the real stakeholders/actors who are the experts in trying to resolve the problem".

On the other hand, some respondents also lamented on the inaction/poor response of government in the post-conflict period. For instance, post conflict regaining processes is multifaceted tasks for the state and society at large. When authority of a state (at the centre or periphery) collapsed by conflict occurrences, the remaining structure also lose its acceptability in post conflict era, thus leading to socio-political and economic disconnect either at national or regional level. Consequently, authorities concerned often faces challenges in rebuilding governance and win legitimate trust in post conflict era. It is observed and generally acknowledged that committed leadership intended to protect human lives, rights, rule of law, security, responsible public management institutions, efficient representation, equitable service delivery are key

determinants of post conflict rebuilding processes (Ernstorfer, 2007). In line with this, respondent A5 faulted government in post conflict rebuilding process/effort, thus:

*“There must be mediation, reconciliation and processes where you bring the two parties together and try to make settlement. The government must be seen physically to do that”* (In-depth interview with respondent A5, 6<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

Supporting this viewpoint of government failure to respond in post conflict period, respondent E7 thus,

*“...they did not punish the culprit and did not ensure that displaced people are returned to their places. Nobody was prosecuted including the traditional ruler of Zangon-Kataf in whose nose over two hundred and sixty people were killed. He was not even queried”* (In-depth interview with respondent E7, 13<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

However respondent B9 discloses specifically how one of the governors of Kaduna state refused picking a call from a first-class traditional ruler at the time of conflict occurrence thus:

*“He picked his phone and called the then Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa for more than 17 times, but he didn’t answer the call. The emir then called the paramount chiefs who are Christians such as the Agom-Bajju, Agom-Atvap but nobody responded except the Chief of Rumawa. He then tried the number of the zonal area commander of the police but was not going through, before he subsequently reached the DPO who mobilized three mobile police vehicles to go to Zonkwa”* (In-depth interview with respondent B9, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

Another respondent E11, has buttressed B9 saying that post conflict response often suffer neglect as government don’t respond to the complains of the people, what government is just after is to arrest the situation thus,

*“Commissions of inquiry have been set up to investigate from 2011 the white papers and the recommendations, is there anyone who has been punished? There is no one single person that is in prison or killed. Tomorrow they will do again because they know they will go free”* (In-depth interview with respondent E11, 6<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

Similarly, respondents B12, B10, C17 thus,

*“It is unfortunate! I blame government squarely on the happenings in Southern Kaduna. This is because a lot of commissions of inquiry were established, reports tendered, and white papers written but nothing was implemented. If the government has been affecting implementatiosn on the recommendations of the committees it set up, I can assure you that the crisis would not have been at the level it is today. At the end of the day when the committee submitted its report, it was a mere minority and majority report, and to date nothing was done on the report”* (In-depth interview with respondent B10, 24<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

For the above reasons therefore, other respondents viewed the post-conflict government inaction/poor response as politically motivated negligent. Giving by the submission of B9 above, respondent B12 justified that,

*“I think when they take action it will affect mostly their people (the Christians). It may also affect their interests. And you know most of the previous governments only did what would sustain their leadership”* (In-depth interview with respondent B9, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

This political attitude according to the respondent was more often in the previous administrations than the present thus,

*“I can say the previous government from 2011 to 2015 has done nothing to arrest the situation. One, there was not a single arrest made in respect of the crisis. The government only constituted a panel and after it submitted its report it was swept under the carpet”* (In-depth interview with respondent B12, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

So, also respondent C13 who argued that because of the political reason, government have been denying the attacks thus, “Government and some people have been denying this as part of the general denial so that they don’t do what is needed to address the issue”. Looking at government response on properties losses by the victims, respondent C15 lamented thus, “...what we see after every conflict, government goes in with relief materials that are inadequate. It is not enough. It is not even done to talk of, they attack people and you take 20 bags of rice to a community”. Giving credence to poor response by government in post conflict era, respondent C16 has specifically exemplified a situation in the past where various committees were set up and this what happened thus:

*“The outcome was that the states said they were going to set up farmers/pastoralists conflict resolution committees. The committees were set up in most of the states of the north at that time and some of the states in the south west and that the local governments should also do the same. However, the committees were not funded, and the people not trained, and therefore were not effective”* (In-depth interview with respondent C16, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

In view of this, a respondent has accused a particular governor in the past as catapult, for instance, thus,

*“...the former governor Ahmad Muhammed Makarfi is the chief tormentor in all these crises. Ahmed Makarfi is the worst thing [governor] as far as we the Fulbe and Muslims of Southern Kaduna are concerned. And, the crisis even became worst when they got their own as the governor- that is the helicopter burnt Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa”*.

Finally, respondents D23, C18, E11 attested government response only during a conflict as a fire brigade approach and not after, thus, “...government is making effort to stop the conflict when it occurs but doing little in preventing it”. Meanwhile, respondent B9 also,

*“...they did but we are not appreciative. What they did was, immediately when there is problem they would bring the police and military to arrest the situation and thereafter nobody will be arrested. In 2011, immediately they arrested the situation an investigation panel was instituted which received our testimonies afterward nothing happened”* (In-depth interview with respondent B9, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017).

Therefore, a quick look at these perceptions of the interviewees on government responses, showed effective as well ineffective responses of Kaduna state government in streamline from 2011 till 2017. Additionally, other works conducted related to the conflicting issue under study desired the need to revive traditional means of resolving disputes as more effective resolution mechanism than formal institution of legal means due to level of corruption infringing on the processes. Moreover, the ability of the traditional dispute resolution approach according to the scholars Eke (2017), Anyabe et.al (2017) and reports such as memorandum towards peace and security in southern Kaduna submitted by National Human right commission (NHRC) Aguiyi Ironsi street No 19, Maitama Garki -Abuja January 2014; Numana Peace committee report NPC on Ninte Conflict between farmers herders conflict May 2016 is that communities will feel more at ease than going to courts. The court system often creates hatred and worsened the cordial relations among groups instead of to cement it.

Looking at these analytical submissions in relation to ABC’s variable is that the state role as a power container to set environment free from actions and reactions due to value contradictions is ineffective. The incapacitation of the state to its functionaries of maintaining law and order in a multi-ethnic environment leading to negligence, ineffectiveness, partiality and non-responsive to the situation amounting to vicious circle in the occurrence and reoccurrences of the conflict making it escalate and persist as the theory assumes. Moreover, ABC model provides insight by revealing the need to prevent conflicting situation through preventive or early mechanism system. This will pave way to sort out hidden issues i.e. *contradictions and attitudes* before it manifests into violent behavioural action. It is therefore necessary in proactiveness of the security agencies to contain the situation using thorough effective system to checkmate and stabilises the arising tensions

### **Theme two: Community Effort and Non-Governmental Organizations**

Community efforts and NGOs are the non-governmental efforts taken to respond to the escalation of the conflict. While conflicts are often encouraged by either an outsider, or powerful individuals or groups, the consequence however generally befall on the community. Thus, responding to conflict situation requires not only effort from government policy initiatives and security beep-up, but also the community effort at the grassroot supported by NGO's for peace and stability. Community determined effort towards a conflict resolution has great potentiality for workable change due to their local knowledge of the area, what is required that triggered the conflict as well as limitations and assets in the area. The effort of the outdoor agent such as government and security personnel, non-governmental organisations is to simplify and rebuild local capacity of interactions in solving the problem (Persson 2014).

Not many of the respondents viewed that community effort and NGOs, are doing much in helping the community in this conflict escalation. However, there are some of them who argued that community and NGOs play crucial roles in responding to the situation of conflicts. For instance, respondent C18 complimented on the role played by NGO's such as the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) and Southern Kaduna Muslims Development Association (SOKAMUDA). They said:

*"...thank God and some NGOs that came in and organizing seminars and workshops to educate adherents of the two religions on how we should live together"* (In-depth interview with respondent C18, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2017)

Explaining further on the activities of the NGOs outside the government purview, respondent C18 supported by E7, C13 stated that:

*"Obviously, particularly that, that SOKAMUDA again had also quite made a lot of efforts trying to approach the issue outside the government purview. It is like an NGO or informal way of solving the problem"* (In-depth interview with respondent C18, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2017)

The respondents highlighted that the unions meet several times and in different places with respective representatives of both sides Fulani-herdsmen and the farming communities thus:

*"First was to meet the leadership of the Southern Kaduna Peoples' Union SOKAPU to say let us sit down and solve our problem. We are people that nobody can send away from this land. This is also our ancestral land much as you also claim being your ancestral land. They have met in Kaduna, Abuja and even went to Kafanchan where the crisis was. Since then we have not had any problem again. The reports of those meetings were given to the government which has been implementing it, trying to see how the problem could be resolved"* (In-depth interview with respondent B7, 13<sup>th</sup> October 2017)

Based on these perceptions, it is evident that the affected communities as well as the actors of the conflict are tired of the situation and the hostilities among them. Therefore, effort is to be pull together to resolve the conflicting issues involving actors and stake holders giving the usefulness of community's determination to resolve the lingering situation because their knowledge of the area, genesis of the conflict as well as what escalate it. They must all swallow their pride to embrace peace as external support could only rebuild their capacity as scholars as well as Galtonian model stated. In conflict situation, the best solution is any option that suits both sides. Though, this is hardly attainable giving the value/needs or interest contradictions of the conflicting parties. NGO's plays role of monitoring from beginning to the end thereby can mediate and dialogue the conflicting parties. Report from commission of inquiry have called voluntary effort by individuals and associations in managing the situation.by building culture of peace.




Figure 5 1 Theme and subthemes indicating Emergency Security Responses

Figure 5 2 Theme and subthemes indicating Community Effort and NGO

## Conclusion

This study covers the responses by state and non-state in the persistent conflict in the state. The argument by the respondents revolves around emergency responses, effective and preventive mechanism by both state and non-state agencies. Respondents have lamented that government only respond to the conflict by arresting the situation using force peace at the moment with many at times delaying in doing so, whereas effective response to address the issue as well as effective preventing mechanism are inadequate. The study also introduces little or none responses by non-state actors NGOs to the escalating conflict.

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