NORTH KOREAN'S NUCLEARIZATION AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA: DETERRENCE, BARGAINING AND GREAT POWER
Keywords:
Balance of Power, Deterrence Theory, Global Security, North Korea, Nuclear ProliferationAbstract
Since 2006, North Korea has transitioned from a potential to an actual nuclear-armed state, following the successful detonation of multiple nuclear tests and a series of ballistic missile launches. These developments have demonstrated its growing capability to strike adversaries‘ homelands as well as those of their allies within and beyond the Korean Peninsula. The United States has consistently maintained that North Korea‘s nuclear programme constitutes a serious threat to its immediate neighbors‘, the United States itself, and global security at large. Despite the rapid advancement of North Korea‘s nuclear capabilities, there remains considerable debate as to whether the programme is primarily intended for offensive aggression or serves strategic purposes aimed at altering the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and compelling the United States to engage in negotiations through which North Korea seeks economic, political, and security concessions. Against this backdrop, this paper analyses North Korea‘s nuclear programme and its implications for global security. The study adopts a qualitative research approach, relying on documentary analysis of secondary sources, and is anchored in Deterrence Theory. The paper finds that North Korea‘s nuclear programme functions principally as a strategic bargaining instrument and a mechanism for achieving a favorable balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, while simultaneously deterring potential aggression, particularly from the United States and its allies. It further argues that sustained United States pressure on North Korea reflects, to a significant extent, broader strategic competition with China, positioning the Korean Peninsula as a critical arena in contemporary global power politics.


