STRATEGIC CONTINUITY AMIDST TACTICAL VOLATILITY: UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND IRAN NUCLEAR POLICY, 2002–2022
Keywords:
United States foreign policy, Iran nuclear programme, Neoclassical Realism, presidential transitions, JCPOA, coercive diplomacyAbstract
The United States’ responses to Iran’s nuclear programme between 2002 and 2022 present a puzzle of strategic continuity amidst tactical volatility. While the core objective of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran remained consistent across four presidential administrations, the policy instruments employed fluctuated significantly between coercive isolation, institutionalised diplomacy, unilateral maximum pressure, and constrained diplomatic re-engagement. This article examines how presidential transitions shaped these variations in policy instruments while preserving strategic continuity in United States policy toward Iran’s nuclear programme. Using a qualitative case study design based on process tracing and documentary analysis, the study analyses policy developments across the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden through the analytical lens of Neoclassical Realism. The article argues that presidential transitions constituted the principal mechanism driving tactical variation in United States policy toward Iran during this period. It demonstrates how systemic imperatives were filtered through leadership ideology, executive decision-making styles, and domestic political constraints to produce divergent policy outcomes despite a stable strategic objective. Although all four administrations sought to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, they differed sharply in their preferred instruments of statecraft. The Bush administration pursued coercive multilateralism rooted in post-9/11 securitisation; the Obama administration institutionalised diplomatic engagement through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); the Trump administration adopted unilateral maximum pressure following withdrawal from the agreement; and the Biden administration pursued constrained diplomatic re-engagement amid heightened domestic polarisation and diminished strategic trust. The article concludes that the instability of United States–Iran nuclear policy reflects the structural vulnerability of executive-dominated diplomacy within polarised political systems where international agreements lack legislative entrenchment, thereby limiting the durability of negotiated non-proliferation settlements across presidential transitions.
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